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ABSTRACT
SELF-CONSISTENCY IN SEQUENTIAL DECISION-MAKING
Long Luu
Alan A. Stocker
Human decisions are rarely made in isolation. We typically have to make a sequence of
decisions to reach a goal. Studies in economics and cognitive psychology have shown that
making a decision may result in several biases in subsequent judgments. Similar biases have
also recently been found in human percepts of low-level stimuli such as motion direction.
What lacking is a principled framework that can account for several sequential dependencies between judgments. Towards that goal, in my thesis, I propose and experimentally test
a self-consistent Bayesian observer model that assumes humans maintain self-consistency
along the inference process. In Chapter 2, I first demonstrate that after having made a
categorical decision on stimulus orientation, subjects’ estimate of the stimulus is systematically biased away from the decision boundary. Two additional experiments suggest that
the bias occurs because subjects treat their first decision as a fact and use that to constrain
the subsequent estimation. Model fit to the data in my experiments and data in previous
studies show that the self-consistent Bayesian model can quantitatively account for human
behaviors in a wide range of experimental settings. In Chapter 3, using the same decisionestimation tasks, I probed the post-decision sensory representation by providing feedback
on the categorical decision. I found that subjects’ sensory representation is kept intact and
the self-consistency is implemented by conditioning the prior distribution on the categorical
decision. The results also suggest another interesting form of self-consistency when subjects’
decision was incorrect: they reconstructed the sensory measurement to make it consistent
with the given feedback. In Chapter 4, I found that the choice-induced bias also occurs
in human judgment of number. The bias is similar for both non-symbolic (cloud of dots)
and symbolic (sequence of Arabic numerals) forms of number. Finally, I propose in the
general discussion how the self-consistent Bayesian framework may account for other biases
in sequential decision-making such as the halo effect and sunk-cost fallacy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As the field of machine intelligence advances at a blistering pace, we are now used to
hearing breaking news about machine beating human experts on many areas once thought
to be exclusively for the human. That ranges from AlphaGo beating Go champions (Silver
et al., 2016, 2017), machine learning algorithms making medical decisions (Obermeyer and
Emanuel, 2016; Kononenko, 2001) to autonomous robots fighting in wars (Singer, 2010;
Ayoub and Payne, 2016). It leaves many of us to wonder what will be left for human
intelligence. A common response is that we are still far from building a machine that makes
a medical diagnosis in the morning, then drives to a friend’s home to play a chess game in
the afternoon and is ready to get in war at any time if necessary. In other words, the best
machines excel humans at a specific area yet fall far behind an average person in all other
areas (Lake et al., 2017; Kasparov, 2017).
Among areas that machines are still behind human in many regards is perception which
involves judgments about basic properties of the world. Deep Blue computer that defeated
Gary Kasparov cannot tell whether the sky is blue or how deep the ocean is. The ease
with which we make such perceptual decisions conceals the complexity of the underlying
processes. For instance, driving appears to be a fairly basic skill for most people, yet it
requires a tremendous amount of complicated decisions many of which involve inference
about perceptual features of the world (e.g. what are the surrounding objects and how far
away or how fast are they?). The challenges are more obvious with the development of stateof-the-art technologies such as self-driving cars or humanoid robots. In fact, research on
perception dates back to as early as the 19th century when the pioneers like Gustav Fechner
and Hermann von Helmholtz conceived the lawful relations between the mental process and
the physical world (Fechner, 1860; Helmholtz, 1867; Weber, 1867). An intensive body of
Go to Table of Contents
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works has followed those early attempts and greatly advanced our understanding of how
humans perceive the world (Cornsweet, 2012; Blakemore, 1993; Wandell, 1995; Green and
Swets, 1966; Wolfe et al., 2006). In these studies, human subjects typically make a single
judgment on a simple stimulus in each trial (see Supplemental-psychophysics methods for a
brief overview of experimental methods). Crucially, the dominant theoretical frameworks in
perception such as linear system theory (Wandell, 1995), signal detection theory (Macmillan
and Creelman, 2004) and Bayesian decision theory (Kersten and Schrater, 2002; Maloney,
2002) mostly assume that perceptual judgments are made independent of each other. As a
result, a perceptual decision should not affect subsequent judgments.
However, several lines of research in cognition and perception suggest that there exist
many forms of sequential dependency between decisions. In cognitive psychology and economics, a rich body of works found evidence that a decision may cause systematic biases
in subsequent judgments (Abelson, 1968; Kahneman, 2011). For instance, when humans
made a sequence of judgments on the same stimulus features, the later judgment tend to
be distorted to be consistent with the preceding decision (Brehm, 1956). Several other
decisional biases induced by preceding judgments have also been well documented such as
confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), halo effect (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977) and sunk-cost
fallacy (Arkes and Blumer, 1985).
Several perception studies have found that perceptual decisions across trials exhibit
specific patterns such as repetition or alternation despite the fact that the experimental
stimuli were randomized (Fernberger, 1920; Gold et al., 2008; Fründ et al., 2014). An
important difference between these studies and the cognitive literature mentioned above is
that subjects only made one decision in each trial, which makes it difficult to have a direct
comparison. More recently, a small body of works in perception had multiple judgments in
each trial and show biases that are similar to the cognitive biases (Jazayeri and Movshon,
2007; Zamboni et al., 2016; Bronfman et al., 2015). As an example, a study by Jazayeri
and Movshon (2007) shows that after having made a decision on motion direction of a dot
cloud, subjects’ percept of the stimulus motion direction was systematically biased away
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from the decision boundary.
Although there exist many ad hoc theories that can explain each of these bias effects,
what we lack is a unifying model framework that may account for many of the findings
and provide fruitful predictions for future research. Towards that goal, my thesis extends a
self-conditioned Bayesian observer model (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2007) and demonstrates
through several experiments how the model can quantitatively account for sequential dependency in human perceptual decisions across various experimental settings.
In the rest of the chapter, I provide the necessary background for the readers that are
not familiar with the relevant literature. Specifically, I will review key studies that show
several forms of sequential dependency between decisions in cognition and perception. Then
I will review the standard framework of Bayesian decision theory as applied in perception.

1.1. Sequential dependency in cognitive judgments
In 1956, the psychologist Leon Festinger published a book to describe the behavior of members in a religious cult that believes the world would be destroyed by a flood on December
21, 1954 and the believers would be saved by a flying saucer (Festinger et al., 1956). Interestingly, after they found out that the end of the world did not happen, they readily
accepted the leader’ argument that the world is saved by their extreme piety and even
doubled down on their belief and fervently proselytized for it. To explain the phenomenon,
Festinger developed a theory of cognitive dissonance which posits that people dislike
holding contradictory beliefs in mind and tend to modify them to maintain a sense of consistency (Festinger, 1957). In the religious cult example, the members’ belief that the world
would be destroyed is highly dissonant with the belief that the event did not happen. Importantly, they cannot change either of them because they had given up everything (jobs,
spouses, possessions) to follow the cult. Therefore, they easily fell prey to demagoguery
claims and actively advanced those arguments that may help in reconciling these dissonant
beliefs.
Following on Festinger’s pioneering works, a large body of experimental studies has
found evidence that is consistent with cognitive dissonance theory (Abelson, 1968; Festinger
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and Carlsmith, 1959; Bem, 1972; Knox and Inkster, 1968; Younger et al., 1977; Frenkel and
Doob, 1976; Cohen and Goldberg, 1970). In a study by Brehm (1956) subjects were asked
to rate the desirability of eight items (e.g. coffee-maker, toaster, stopwatch). Then they had
to choose between two equally desirable options (e.g. coffee-maker vs. toaster) and rate the
items again. In accordance with cognitive dissonance theory, subjects’ ratings of the items
after a difficult decision change according to their choice, that is, the value of chosen item
increases whereas the value of rejected item decreases. This line of works has been revived
recently (Lee and Schwarz, 2010) and researchers recast it as choice-induced preference
(Egan et al., 2010; Sharot et al., 2010, 2012) or preservation of coherence/consistency (Simon
et al., 2004; Riefer et al., 2017). By using choice-blindness paradigm (Johansson et al., 2005),
the studies on choice-induced preference confirm that cognitive dissonance effect is not due
to statistical artifacts as pointed out by Chen and Risen (2010).
As reviewed above, cognitive dissonance studies demonstrate sequential dependency
between judgments that subjects make on the same feature using the same evidence. However, the practical situation that a decision maker encounters often involves judgments on
different attributes (e.g. intelligence, experience, and integrity of a job candidate). If the
judgments are made sequentially, the order in which the attributes are considered may significantly affect the judgment results as demonstrated in studies on halo effect (Nisbett
and Wilson, 1977; Thorndike, 1920; Sigall and Ostrove, 1975; Leuthesser et al., 1995). Another typical real-life scenario is when we cannot acquire all relevant information at once.
Hence, we first make a preliminary decision and subsequently incorporate any additional information presented to us. For example, a company decides to invest in a promising project
with an initial estimated budget of $100 million dollars. Halfway through the project, all
money is spent and it is estimated that another $100 million dollars are needed to finish
it. Moreover, the project is not as promising as it was and the same amount of money can
be spent on another more profitable project. What should the company do? Anecdotal
observation and empirical evidence have shown that the company is more likely to continue
the existing project. Noticeably, if it had not invested in the existing project, it would more
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likely invest in the new project. This phenomenon is named sunk-cost fallacy (Arkes and
Blumer, 1985; Staw, 1976). A related ”irrational” behavior, confirmation bias, was also well
documented in several studies which suggest that subjects tend to search for information
supporting their previous decision (Nickerson, 1998; Mynatt et al., 1977; Jonas et al., 2001).
Those scenarios will be discussed more extensively in section 5.2.

1.2. Sequential dependency in perceptual judgments
1.2.1. Single-judgment task
Even in the standard psychophysics experiments that include a single decision in a trial,
researchers have long noticed some dependency in subjects’ decisions across trials. As early
as 1920, Fernberger (1920) found that when subjects made a simple discrimination on a pair
of weights (”lighter”, ”heavier” or ”equal”), their decision in the current trial was repulsed
away from the decision in the previous trial (e.g. they tended to respond ”lighter” when
the response had been ”heavier” in the preceding trial). Several subsequent studies using
a wide range of stimuli and task designs found mixed results. In some studies, subjects
tended to avoid the previous response (Arons and Irwin, 1932; Preston, 1936; Collier, 1951)
whereas other studies show that subjects tended to repeat the previous response (Senders
and Sowards, 1952; Senders, 1953; Verplanck et al., 1952; Day, 1956; McGill, 1957). Several
studies have tried to determine the factors that influence this dependency such as training
(Verplanck et al., 1953), intertrial interval, experimental duration (Collier, 1954; Day, 1957)
and previous stimulus identity (Verplanck and Blough, 1958; Collier and Verplanck, 1958).
More recent studies replicated the sequential dependency and demonstrated that the effect
cannot be explained by motor bias, sensory adaptation or attentional effect (Akaishi et al.,
2014; Fründ et al., 2014; Braun et al., 2018). When feedback was given in every trial,
subjects’ decision is dependent on the feedback in the previous trial: repetition if correct
and alternation if incorrect (win-stay, lose-switch) (Busse et al., 2011; Abrahamyan et al.,
2016; Urai et al., 2017).
How can we explain this type of sequential dependency? Some proposed that the dependency comes from subjects’ response bias, that is, subjects’ responses tend to form
Go to Table of Contents
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a pattern even when the stimulus is totally ambiguous (Tune, 1964; Goodfellow, 1938).
Other researchers approached the problem from the perspective of signal detection theory
and suggested that the dependency occurs because the observer’s decision criterion systematically fluctuates throughout the experiment (Treisman and Williams, 1984; Dorfman
and Biderman, 1971; Kac, 1962). More specifically, after a response, the observer shifts
the criterion by a certain amount and the shift direction will determine the avoidance or
repetition dependency. In the framework of drift-diffusion model, sequential dependency is
suggested to happen because the starting point of evidence accumulation process is biased
by the statistics of previous responses and/or feedback (Gold et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2017;
de Lange et al., 2013). Along the same line, Akaishi et al. (2014) proposes that the history
of previous decisions affects subsequent ones through a reinforcement learning process that
updates based on subject’s decision instead of feedback (note that there was no feedback in
their experiments). In the context of Bayesian observer model, Angela and Cohen (2009)
suggest that the observer assumes the environment is inherently volatile so that the probability of stimulus being repeated or alternated changes over time (see Glaze et al. (2015)
for a similar account using drift diffusion model).
Essentially, the above explanations for sequential dependency posit that decisions across
trials are dependent because they share a common source (response bias, decision criterion,
history of previous trials/feedback or prior belief about environmental stability). That
is different from what is typically thought about sequential dependency in the cognitive
literature discussed above: a preceding decision directly biases subsequent decisions. The
closest explanation in perceptual studies comes from Gold et al. (2008) and Akaishi et al.
(2014) which suggest previous decisions directly affect subsequent ones. However, they also
found that the effect of immediately preceding decision is either negligible or insufficient to
account for the data. This discrepancy may be partly because in the perceptual studies,
subjects only made a single judgment in each trial and the trials were often designed to be
random and independent of each other. That differs from the cognitive literature in which
subjects made multiple judgments in each trial. In the next section, I will review a small
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but growing body of works in perception that bears a close resemblance to such situation.

1.2.2. Multiple-judgment task
In a perceptual task that is analogous to cognitive dissonance experiments, subjects had to
make two sequential judgments on a cloud of moving dots: they first indicated whether the
dots’ motion direction was clockwise or counterclockwise of a decision boundary; then they
had to report the perceived motion direction of the dots (Jazayeri and Movshon, 2007). The
authors found that subjects’ estimates in the second task were systematically biased away
from the decision boundary. Importantly, the estimate bias is in the same direction as the
decision. For instance, if their decision was clockwise in the first judgment, the estimate
was biased away from the decision boundary in the clockwise direction. Furthermore, the
bias magnitude was larger when the task was more difficult, that is, when the dots’ motion
direction was closer to the decision boundary or when the noise in the dots’ motion direction
was high. The findings were replicated in another study by Zamboni et al. (2016).
Along the same line, several studies on decision confidence found that decision may
bias subsequent judgment of confidence. In a study by Zylberberg et al. (2012), subjects
first made a categorical decision about the motion of a dots cloud (e.g. left or right),
then they had to report their confidence on a continuous scale. The authors found that
subjects’ confidence judgments depend more on stimulus evidence supporting the decision
than evidence opposing the decision. Similar results using face/house stimuli were found in
Peters et al. (2017) at both behavioral and neural levels. The results imply that subjects
are overconfident after the decision (see Yu et al. (2015a) for the under-confidence scenario).
Bronfman et al. (2015) show sequential dependency in a perceptual task similar to
the sunk-cost fallacy scenario. Subjects were first presented with a sequence of 8 symbolic
numbers and indicated whether the sequence average was less or greater than 50. Then
another sequence of 8 numbers were displayed and subjects had to estimate the average
of all 16 numbers. By regressing subjects’ final estimates on the presented numbers, the
authors found that subjects significantly down-weighed the evidence in the second sequence
compared to the first sequence. They interpreted the results as showing that by making
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a preliminary decision on the first sequence, subjects reduced sensitivity to the second
sequence.

1.3. Bayesian decision theory
The key assumption of this theoretical approach is that humans maintain an internal model
of how the world works (generative/forward model) and this internal model is characterized by probabilistic relations between variables. In this framework, perception can be
formulated as an inverse process that infers hidden variables from the observed variables.
For example, a baseball player wants to know the velocity of a ball flying in the air. In
most cases, he doesn’t have direct access to the true velocity of the ball (hidden variable)
but instead he has some indirect information (observed variable) that is related to that
variable. The most simple generative model assumes there is a true velocity v of the ball
which the player doesn’t know and would like to estimate (Fig. 1.1a). The player’s visual
system collects sensory evidence mv about the true velocity which is a noisy copy of v. The
player’s task is to infer the ball’s true velocity, v from the sensory evidence, mv . Note that
the internal models may vary in structure and level of details and that depends on several
factors such as the task specification or subjects’ past experience. In the baseball example,
the player may have a more complicated internal model. For instance, his visual system
may gather sensory evidence of the distance d traveled by the ball between two time points
and the traveling time t (Fig. 1.1b). In this case, the player has to infer the ball’s velocity
from the sensory evidence of distance md and time mt .
Among many ways to solve the problem, Bayesian decision theory provides a principled
approach that can be interpreted intuitively. There are 3 main components of Bayesian
decision theory: the prior distribution, the likelihood function and the loss function, each
of which will be explained in detail below.
The prior distribution represents the observer’s prior belief about the variable to be
estimated before the sensory evidence is gathered. Technically, it is a probability distribution over the feasible space of the estimated variable. In the baseball example, the prior
distribution p(v) represents the probability of possible velocity values of the ball before the
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player observes the current flying ball. An example of prior distribution shown in Fig. 1.1c
illustrates the observer’s prior belief that the ball’s velocity tends to be slow rather than
fast. Several studies provide supportive evidence for this tendency of people’s prior belief
about speed in general (Weiss et al., 2002; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Hürlimann et al.,
2002).
Another important factor in Bayesian decision theory is the observer’s belief about the
process that generates the sensory information. In the baseball example, this process may
include how light is reflected off the ball and arrives at the player’s retina and how the
retina and early visual system convert that incoming light pattern into neural signals. The
whole process is often simplified by a noise model p(mv |v) that indicates the probability
of obtaining a sensory evidence mv given the true velocity v. In the estimation task,
the sensory evidence is observed and fixed. When we write p(mv |v) as a function of v,
it becomes the likelihood function. Therefore, the likelihood function represents the
observer’s uncertainty about the sensory evidence and is totally determined by the whole
process that takes place from the stimulus to the sensory evidence. For example, if the
observer assumes the sensory evidence vm is the result of adding Gaussian noise to the true
velocity v, the conditional distribution p(mv |v) is a Gaussian distribution centered on v and
the standard deviation is constant for all v. That gives rise to a likelihood function that
has the Gaussian shape as illustrated in Fig. 1.1c.
Perception not only serves as a subjective experience but also has real consequences
when it guides the observer’s action in most practical situations (e.g. whether a player
successfully catches a ball or not). The observer’s belief about the consequence of its decision
is quantified by the loss function which indicates how the decision error is penalized.
Specifically, the loss function L(v̂, v) represents the cost of making decision v̂ when the true
stimulus value is v. For computational convenience, the loss function is often defined as
a parametric function of the difference between the decision and the true stimulus v̂ − v
(i.e. the decision error). Fig. 1.1c illustrates the squared loss function L(v̂, v) = (v̂ − v)2
which penalizes large error more strongly than small error. Another common loss function
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is an absolute function of the error, L(v̂, v) = |v̂ − v| which also penalizes large error more
but to a lesser extent than the squared loss. The loss function typically depends on the
task and the reward structure. For instance, the squared or absolute loss functions may be
appropriate for the baseball example because a small error is likely to be less costly than a
large error (the player can still catch the ball if his hand is just a little bit away from the
true position of the ball). In contrast, when the observer has to make a categorical decision
(e.g. answering a multiple-choice question in an exam), the 0/1 loss function is often more
suitable because getting credit requires an exactly correct answer:

L(v̂ − v) =




0

if v̂ = v



1

if v̂ 6= v

(1.1)

Given that all three main components (prior distribution, likelihood function and loss
function) are well-defined in a task, Bayesian decision theory provides a Bayes optimal
rule to make a decision. By using Bayes rule, the prior distribution is combined with the
likelihood function to form the posterior distribution:

p(v|mv ) =

p(mv |v) · p(v)
p(mv )

(1.2)

In the baseball example, the posterior distribution p(v|mv ) represents the player’s belief
about the ball’s velocity v after integrating the sensory evidence with his prior belief. Because p(mv ) is independent of v in Eqs. (1.2), it is just a normalizing constant for the
purpose of estimating v. Then depending on the loss function, the observer makes a point
estimate v̂ based on the posterior distribution p(v|mv ). For instance, if we use the squared
loss function, the estimate is the mean of the posterior distribution:
Z
v̂(mv ) =

v · p(v|mv )dv

(1.3)

For the absolute and the 0/1 loss function, the estimates would be the median and the
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mode of the posterior distribution, respectively. Note that the estimate v̂ is a function of
the sensory evidence mv . So Bayes optimal decision rule is a deterministic mapping between
the sensory evidence and the estimate.
So far Bayesian decision theory has been described in terms of the observer’s beliefs
about the world (i.e. the generative model, prior, likelihood and loss function) and how the
observer makes Bayes optimal decision with these beliefs. An obvious question is whether
those beliefs reflect the facts about the physical world. It is an interesting question because
if the observer’s beliefs match the physical world, Bayesian decision theory is not just a
descriptive framework which only aims to describe what is going on but it is also a
prescriptive framework which defines the optimal strategy to make a decision. In fact,
this issue has been investigated long before the Bayesian approach to perception becomes
popular. Brunswik and Kamiya (1953) studied whether Gestalt rules of how humans group
items accord with the statistical regularities of the environment. They found that some
rules indeed reflect the statistical regularities of the world (e.g. the proximity principle in
which items closer to each other tend to belong to the same object). Several studies have
followed up on that using Bayesian approach and also found a fairly good match between
human beliefs and the statistical structure of the environment (Geisler et al., 2001; Geisler
and Perry, 2009; Burge et al., 2010; Girshick et al., 2011; Kim and Burge, 2018). Those
studies mostly touch on the prior distribution. Other components of Bayesian decision
theory (generative model, likelihood and loss function) seem to be harder to investigate.
For example, it is not always straightforward to determine the loss function. Gambles in the
casino (roulette, blackjack, etc.) may have a clear reward structure. In contrast, choosing
between orange and apple primarily depends on individual preferences. As a result, there is
still a lot of open questions regarding Bayesian decision theory as a prescriptive framework.
Application of Bayesian decision theory to the study of perception has been both successful and fruitful because it can account for a wide range of experimental data and has the
potential to generate interesting testable predictions. Several studies have shown that human perceptual decisions agree to a large extent with the predictions of Bayesian inference
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across a wide variety of stimuli and tasks such as the perception of depth (Ernst and Banks,
2002; Knill, 2007; Jacobs, 1999), velocity (Ascher and Grzywacz, 2000; Hürlimann et al.,
2002), color (Brainard and Freeman, 1997; Brainard et al., 2006), sound (Gifford et al.,
2014), time (Jazayeri and Shadlen, 2010; Acerbi et al., 2012; Shi et al., 2013), multi-sensory
stimulus (Körding et al., 2007) as well as sensorimotor tasks (Körding and Wolpert, 2004;
Körding and Wolpert, 2006).

1.4. Supplemental-psychophysics methods
Scaling procedure: In a common form of scaling, subjects are typically asked to assign a
numerical value to their perceived intensity of the stimulus (Stevens, 1946, 1957; Marks,
1974). For example, the experimenter presents a standard sound as an anchor and assign
a number 10 to the loudness of that sound. Then another comparison sound is played and
subjects have to indicate how loud the comparison is relative to the standard sound (e.g.
20 if the comparison is twice as loud as the standard) (Stevens, 1956). Not all scaling
methods involve numerical assignment. In the Farnsworth-Munsell 100-Hue test, subjects
are shown a row of colored papers that are randomly ordered and vary in hue. The first
and last papers are fixed and subjects have to order the other papers to make a ”smooth
color series” (Farnsworth, 1943).
Forced choice task: Because many scaling methods involve subjects’ comprehension or production of numbers, any abnormality in number perception may contaminate the result. The
forced choice method may overcome this by asking subjects to make a simple categorical response to the stimulus (Fechner, 1860; Green and Swets, 1966). In a typical two-alternative
forced choice experiment, two stimuli (e.g. two circular gratings with different orientations)
are presented and subjects have to make a binary decision (e.g. which grating is more
clockwise). By analyzing the data of forced choice method using signal detection theory
(Macmillan and Creelman, 2004), we can make useful inference about subjects’ sensitivity
to the stimulus (e.g. subjects’ discrimination threshold) and subjects’ decision biases (e.g.
subjects’ tendency to respond clockwise regardless of the stimulus).
Adjustment/Matching method: A classic experiment using this method was performed more
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than a hundred years ago by James Clerk Maxwell (Maxwell, 1857). To study human color
perception, he constructed a countertop which consists of two disks put on top of each other.
The smaller disk on top is painted with a reference color. The bigger disk on the bottom is
divided into three wedges whose colors are vermilion, emerald green and ultramarine blue
(the three primary colors). During the experiment, the disks are spun very fast so that the
three colors of the big disk on the bottom are seen as being blended together, resulting in
the percept of a single color. Subjects were tasked to adjust the proportion of three primary
colors until the color of the top and the bottom disks are the same. An illustration of the
design can be found here (http://www.handprint.com/HP/WCL/colortop.html).
There are many variations of the above methods and interested readers can find more
details in Kingdom and Prins (2010), Macmillan and Creelman (2004) and Lu and Dosher
(2013).
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Figure 1.1: Example to illustrate Bayesian decision theory. (a) A simple generative model
can be used to represent the problem of estimating the velocity of a ball: v indicates the
true velocity and mv indicates the sensory evidence about the ball’s velocity. The task is to
infer v from mv . (b) A more complicated generative model can be used. Here the observer
infers the ball velocity from sensory information about the distance traveled by the ball and
the travel time. (c) Three main components of Bayesian decision theory are shown: prior
distribution, likelihood function and loss function. The prior distribution is an exponentially
decreasing function, indicating the observer’s belief of predominantly slow moving objects.
The likelihood function is a Gaussian distribution centered on the sensory measurement.
Loss function is a squared function of the difference between estimated and true velocity.
A Bayesian observer computes the posterior distribution from the prior distribution and
the likelihood function. Then an estimate is made by computing the mean of the posterior
distribution.
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Chapter 2
Self-consistent inference

2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I set the theoretical foundation for the thesis by refining and experimentally
validating a hypothesis that may explain for several sequential dependencies between decisions discussed in Chapter 1 (see section 1.2 and 1.3.2). Specifically, I tested the hypothesis
that an observer’s inclination to maintain a self-consistent, hierarchical interpretation of the
world leads to the observed post-decision biases in perceptual judgments. We expressed this
hypothesis with a self-consistent Bayesian observer model, which assumes that a subject’s
estimate is not only conditioned on the sensory evidence but also on the subject’s preceding
categorical judgment. The model extends a previous formulation (Stocker and Simoncelli,
2007) as it takes into account that sensory information in working memory degrades over
time, which has important implications with regard to the behavioral benefits of the proposed hypothesis. I validated the model with three different psychophysical experiments
that were based on a perceptual task sequence in which subjects were asked to perform
a categorical orientation judgment followed by an orientation estimate of a visual stimulus. Results from the first experiment, using a similar design as the original experiment
by Jazayeri and Movshon (2007), suggest that post-decision biases are general to different
low-level visual stimuli. The other two experiments were targeted to specifically test key
assumptions of the model such as the probabilistic dependence of the biases on sensory
priors. I show that the self-consistent observer model accurately accounts not only for the
data from our experiments but also from a previous study (Zamboni et al., 2016). The
similarity to well-documented bias effects in social psychology and economics suggests that
the proposed self-consistent model may provide a general framework for modeling sequential

Go to Table of Contents

15

decision-making1 .

2.2. Replicating choice-induced bias
The first goal was to obtain a quantitative characterization of how the perceptual inference
process is affected by a preceding, categorical decision task (Fig. 2.1a). In Experiment 1
subjects first indicated whether the overall orientation of an array of lines was clockwise
(cw) or counter-clockwise (ccw) relative to a discrimination boundary (discrimination task),
and then had to reproduce their perceived overall stimulus orientation by adjusting a reference line (estimation task). The experimental design was similar to that of a previous
experiment (Jazayeri and Movshon, 2007) (see also Zamboni et al. (2016)) with the notable
exceptions that we used an orientation rather than a motion stimulus, and that subjects
had to perform the estimation task in every trial rather than only in one third of the trials
(Fig. 2.1b). We found that subjects’ perceptual behavior was very similar to the findings of
these previous studies (Jazayeri and Movshon, 2007; Zamboni et al., 2016). Discrimination
performance monotonically depended on stimulus noise. Furthermore, reported stimulus
orientations showed clear repulsive biases away from the discrimination boundary with
larger biases for larger stimulus noise and orientations closer to the boundary (Fig. 2.1c).
This behavior is fully revealed in the overall distributions of subjects’ estimates for every
noise level (Fig. 2.1d; see Figure supplement 2.11 for individual subjects): The distributions
exhibit a characteristic bimodal shape for stimulus orientations close to the decision boundary, with subjects’ estimates biased away from the decision boundary toward the side that
corresponds to their preceding discrimination judgment. Together with previous findings
(Jazayeri and Movshon, 2007; Zamboni et al., 2016), the results of Experiment 1 suggest
that the observed post-decision biases are independent of the specific type of stimulus used.
Also, they indicate that subjects’ anticipation of the frequency of the estimation task (every
trial vs. only in 1/3 of the trials) does not play a role in causing the biases.
1
This is in line with the general idea by Lecky (1945) that an individual must remain a self-consistent
unit in the way it interacts with the outside world.
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Figure 2.1: Post-decision biases in a perceptual task sequence. (a) Perceptual decisionmaking in an estimation-discrimination task sequence: Does a discrimination judgment
causally affect a subject’s subsequent perceptual estimate? (b) Experiment 1: After being
presented with an orientation stimulus (array of lines), subjects first decided whether the
overall array orientation was clockwise (cw) or counter-clockwise (ccw) of a discrimination
boundary, and then had to estimate the actual orientation by adjusting a reference line
with a joystick. Different stimulus noise levels were established by changing the orientation
variance in the array stimulus. (c) Psychometric functions and estimation biases (combined
subject). Estimation biases are only shown for correct trials and are combined across cw
and ccw directions. Subjects show larger repulsive biases the noisier the stimulus and the
closer the stimulus orientation was to the boundary. (d) Distributions of estimates for the
three stimulus noise levels tested, plotted as a function of the true stimulus orientation
relative to the discrimination boundary (combined subject). Estimates are clearly biased
away from the discrimination boundary forming a characteristic bimodal pattern.
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2.3. Self-consistent Bayesian observer model
How are these post-decision biases explained? A Bayesian observer that regards the task
sequence as a two independent inference processes does not predict the biases. The observer
uses Bayesian statistics to determine the correct categorical judgment (e.g. ’cw’) based on
the stimulus response of a population of sensory neurons, and does the same to infer the
best possible estimate of the stimulus orientation (Fig. 2.2a). Consequently, this observer’s
discrimination judgment does not affect the estimation process; orientation estimates are
unimodally distributed around the true stimulus orientation and do not exhibit the characteristic bimodal pattern that we have observed in Experiment 1 (Fig. 2.1d). In the context
of this paper, we refer to this model as the “independent” observer.
In contrast, we propose an observer model that regards the two tasks as causally dependent (Fig. 2.2b); that is, by making the discrimination judgment the observer constrains
its subsequent estimation process to consider only those stimulus orientations that are consistent with the judgment. It is as if the observer regards its own, subjective discrimination
judgment as an objective fact. Such behavior seems irrational (obviously, the judgment
could be incorrect) and furthermore leads to characteristic estimation biases away from the
discrimination boundary. It has the advantage, however, that the observer’s perceptual inference process remains self-consistent throughout the entire task sequence at any moment
in time. We refer to this model as the “self-consistent” observer. It can be formulated
as a conditioned Bayesian model (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2007) that jointly accounts for
subjects’ behavior in both the discrimination and the estimation task. However, a closer
comparison between the predicted (Fig. 2.2b) and the measured distribution of the estimates
(Fig. 2.1d) reveals that this basic formulation does not capture all details accurately.
We formulated the self-consistent observer model as a two-step inference process over
the extended hierarchical generative model shown in Fig. 2.3a: Based on a noisy sensory
signal m, the observer first infers the category C (’cw’ or ’ccw’) by performing the discrimination task and then infers the stimulus orientation θ in the estimation task. Because the
stimulus has long disappeared by the time the observer performs the estimation task, we
Go to Table of Contents
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Figure 2.2: Bayesian observer models for the perceptual task sequence. (a) The discrimination judgment does not affect the estimated stimulus orientation for an observer who
considers both tasks independently. (b) In contrast, the self-consistent observer imposes a
causal dependency such that the judgment in the discrimination task (e.g. ’cw’) conditions
the estimation process in form of a choice-dependent prior. It effectively sets the posterior
probability to zero for any orientation value that is inconsistent with the preceding discrimination judgment. The truncated posterior distribution, together with a loss function that
penalizes larger estimation errors stronger than smaller ones, leads to the characteristic bimodal distribution pattern. Note, however, that this basic formulation is not quite sufficient
to explain some details of the distribution pattern of subjects’ estimates (Fig. 2.1d).
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assume that estimation of θ must rely on a noisy memory recall mm of the sensory signal m.
Inference on θ is then conditioned on the preceding discrimination judgment (e.g. C = ’cw’),
which ultimately results in the characteristic repulsive estimation biases. Finally, we also
took into account that subjects’ report of their perceived stimulus orientation is corrupted
by motor noise. We measured motor noise for every subject in a control experiment (see
Figure supplement 2.12) and subsequently used these measured values for all model fits
and comparisons. The self-consistent observer model provides a full account of both the
observer’s discrimination judgment and orientation estimate in each trial and is thus jointly
predicting a subject’s psychometric function as well as the distribution of their orientation
estimates.
Figure 2.3b shows the model fit to the data from Experiment 1 for the combined subject. The stimulus noise level determines both the slope of the psychometric curves in the
discrimination task and the magnitude of the bias in the estimation task, which is well
predicted by the model. A comparison between the distributions of subjects’ estimates and
model estimates fully reveals the extent to which the model accurately accounts for the
observed human behavior (Fig. 2.3c; See Figure supplement 2.13 for a histogram representation). Note that all model predictions in this paper are the result of a joint fit to both the
measured psychometric functions of the discrimination task and the estimation distribution.
The self-consistent observer model can also account for the substantial individual differences in behavior across subjects. While individual bias patterns are all repulsive, they
vary across subjects both in shape and magnitude (Fig. 2.4a). These variations are well
captured by the model and reflected in individual differences in the fit parameter values
such as the prior width and the level of sensory noise (Fig. 2.4b; see Figure supplement 2.14
for a goodness-of-fit analysis). Interestingly, all subjects seemed to substantially overestimate the width of the stimulus prior compared to the true stimulus distribution. This
did not come entirely as a surprise because subjects were never explicitly informed about
the stimulus range and thus had to learn it over the course of the experiment. Consistent
with this interpretation is the fact that the subject with the most accurate estimate of the
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Figure 2.3: The self-consistent Bayesian observer model. (a) Directed graph representing
the generative hierarchical model: Sensory measurement m is a noisy sample of stimulus
orientation θ. Every θ belongs to one of two categories C ={’cw’,’ccw’}. Given an observed
m, the self-consistent model first performs inference over C (discrimination task), and then
infers the value of θ conditioned on the preceding discrimination judgment (e.g. Ĉ =’cw’)
(estimation task). Inference for the estimation task is assumed to be based on a noisy
memory recall mm of the sensory measurement m. Conditioning on the categorical choice
sets the posterior p(θ|mm , Ĉ) to zero for all values of θ that do not agree with the choice.
This shifts the posterior probability mass away from the discrimination boundary and results
in the repulsive post-decision biases for any loss function that more strongly penalizes large
errors than small ones. Because subjects were instructed to provide estimates as accurate
as possible we assumed a loss function that minimizes mean squared error (L2 loss). (b) We
jointly fit the observer model to all discrimination-estimation data pairs of the combined
data across all subjects in Experiment 1 (combined subject). (c) The model not only
predicts the mean estimation bias (as shown in (b)) but also the entire distributions of
estimates, including those trials where discrimination judgments were incorrect. Data and
model show the characteristic bimodal pattern for orientation estimates. Each column
corresponds to one of the three stimulus noise conditions.
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Figure 2.4: Experiment 1: Data and model fits for individual subjects. (a) Individual subjects
(S1 non-naı̈ve) showed substantial variations in their bias patterns (green curves). These
variations are well explained by individual differences in the fit parameter values of the selfconsistent model (blue curves). For example, the width of the prior directly determines the
location where the bias curves intersect with the x-axis. (b) Fit prior widths wp and noise
levels for the five individual subjects plus the combined subject (Sc). Subjects’ prior widths
suggest that they consistently overestimated the actual stimulus range in the experiment (±
21 degrees; arrow). For all subjects, fit sensory noise σs was comparable and monotonically
dependent on the actual stimulus noise. Memory noise σm was mostly small as expected, yet
dominated for subjects S3 and S5. These two subjects performed poorly in the estimation
task, suggesting that they were not trying to provide an accurate orientation estimate
but simply pointed the cursor to roughly the middle of the stimulus range on the side of
the discrimination boundary they picked in the discrimination task. The resulting bias
curves are basically independent of the stimulus noise and have a slope of approximately -1.
The model captured this behavior by assuming that the sensory information was “washed
out” with a large amount of memory noise. The full model also contained a motor noise
component that was determined for each subject in a separate control experiment. All
errorbars represent the 95% confidence interval computed over 100 bootstrapped sample
sets of the data. See Methods section 2.8 for details.
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prior distribution was the only non-naı̈ve subject S1 who had plenty of extra exposure to
the stimulus range through the participation in various pilot experiments. Extracted noise
levels differ across subjects with the worst subject being approximately twice as noisy as the
best (non-naı̈ve subject S1), yet consistently increase for increasing stimulus noise levels.

2.4. Validating self-consistent Bayesian observer model
2.4.1. Key features of the model
We ran two additional experiments that were designed to specifically probe two key features
of the self-consistent model: Experiment 2 was aimed at testing how subject’s orientation
estimates were dependent on their precise knowledge of the stimulus prior and thus were
consistent with the results of Bayesian inference; Experiment 3 examined whether subjects
indeed treated their discrimination judgments as if they were correct. We recruited a new
set of subjects (S6-S9, plus S1) that performed both experiments. By jointly fitting the
data from both experiment, we also tested how well the model can generalize across tasks2 .
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that at the beginning of each trial,
subjects were explicitly reminded of the total range within which the stimulus orientation
would occur in the trial (Fig. 2.5a). Our assumption was that an explicit display of the
stimulus range provided subjects with a better and presumably narrower representation
of the stimulus distribution (given that subjects seemed to substantially overestimate the
prior in Experiment 1). If so, then the self-consistent observer model would predict a
shift of the bias curves’ crossover point towards the discrimination boundary. As shown
in Figs. 2.5b, the measured bias curves indeed show the predicted shift compared to the
bias curves measured in Experiment 1 (Fig. 2.3b). This shift is also clearly visible in the
distributions of the orientation estimates (see Figure supplement 2.15 for distributions of
individual subjects), which is again accurately accounted for by the model (Fig. 2.5c).
In Experiment 3, we separated the discrimination judgment from the discrimination
task. Subjects were no longer asked to perform the orientation discrimination task but
2

Because subject S1 (the only non-naı̈ve subject) performed all three experiments, fits and model parameters for this subject are the result of a joint fit to the data from all three experiments.
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Figure 2.5: Effect of the stimulus prior. (a) Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1
except that at the beginning of each trial, subjects were shown the total range within which
the stimulus orientation would occur in the trial (gray arc, subtending ± 21 degrees). (b)
We hypothesize that reminding subjects of the exact stimulus range at the beginning of each
trial helps them to form a more accurate (and more narrow) representation of their stimulus
prior. If subjects’ orientation estimates were indeed the result of the conditioned Bayesian
inference as assumed by the self-consistent observer model, then the bias curves should
shift towards the discrimination boundary. The data support this prediction: Subjects’
bias curves (combined subject, see Fig. 2.7 for individual subjects) are shifted towards the
discrimination boundary compared to Exp. 1. (c) As with Exp.1, the fit self-consistent
model provides an accurate description of the distribution pattern of subjects’ orientation
estimates.
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Figure 2.6: Self-made vs. given category assignment. (a) Experiment 3: Instead of performing the discrimination judgment themselves, subjects were provided with a cue indicating
the correct category assignment right before the stimulus was presented. Then, after stimulus presentation, subjects first performed an unrelated color discrimination task in place of
the orientation discrimination task (they needed to remember the randomly assigned color
(red/green) of the cue indicating the correct category) before indicating their perceived
stimulus orientation. (b) According to our model we should see similar estimation biases
in Exp. 2 and 3, which is indeed what we found: because the data are from the same
subjects we can directly compare the bias curves with the results from Exp. 2. (c) Again,
the fit model well accounts for the overall distribution of orientation estimates (combined
subject; see Figure supplement 2.16 for distributions for individual subjects)). Because
the discrimination judgment was given and always correct independent of the noise in the
sensory measurement m, estimates only occurred in the “correct” quadrants. For the same
reason the model also predicts slightly smaller bias magnitudes (compared to Exp.2), which
is also matched by the data (see also Fig. 2.7b).
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instead were signaled right at the beginning of each trial whether the stimulus orientation
would be cw or ccw (Fig. 2.6a). Subjects were instructed that this categorical information
was always correct, which it was. They then performed an unrelated color discrimination
task before finally performing the estimation task. The self-consistent model predicts estimation biases that are basically identical to those of Experiment 2 because it assumes
that subjects treat their own judgment as correct when performing the estimation task.
Indeed, as shown in Fig. 2.6b, subjects’ estimation biases are very similar to the biases in
Experiment 2 (Fig. 2.5b). Because both Experiment 2 and 3 were conducted on the same
set of subjects, the results are directly comparable. We can rule out that subjects may
have ignored the given category assignment in Experiment 3 and implicitly performed the
orientation discrimination task instead. If this were the case, then subjects would have exhibited a large fraction of inconsistent trials (i.e. trials in which the estimated orientation
was not in agreement with the given correct answer) in particular for orientations close to
the discrimination boundary. This was not the case as we observed only small fractions
of inconsistent trials (4% on average) that were of similar magnitude as the error rates for
the (irrelevant) color discrimination task (2%). We discuss these inconsistent trials in more
detail in the next section below.
We again extended our analysis to individual subjects’ behavior. Figure 2.7a shows
subjects’ estimation biases in both experiments as well as the corresponding model predictions based on a joint fit to data from both Experiment 2 and 3. Bias patterns, while quite
variable across subjects, are consistent across the two experiments for each subject. This
confirms that the impact of the categorical discrimination judgment on the perceived orientation does not depend on whether the judgment was performed by the subjects themselves
or not. The model captures both the inter-subject as well as the within-subject variability
across the two experiments. Biases are slightly smaller in Experiment 3 compared to Experiment 2 for stimulus orientations close to the boundary. As shown in Fig. 2.7b, the model
correctly predicts this difference because the self-made discrimination judgments in Experiment 2 are based on the noisy stimulus measurement m and therefore can be incorrect,
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Figure 2.7: Experiments 2 and 3: Joint fit to data for individual subjects. (a) Five subjects
(S1, S6-9) participated both in Exp. 2 and 3. We performed a joint model fit to the data
from both experiments for every subject. Each column shows data (green curves) and model
fit (blue curves) for a particular subject. As in Exp. 1, the bias pattern across subjects
shows substantial variability yet is strikingly similar between the two experiments. (b)
Comparing the mean biases observed in Exps. 2 and 3 reveals that biases in Exp. 3 are
slightly smaller for stimulus orientations close to the boundary. This effect is predicted by
the model. (c) Prior widths wp and noise levels from the joint fit for individual subjects and
the combined subject. Subjects’ priors were closer to the experimental distribution than in
Exp. 1 because in Exps. 2 and 3 subjects were reminded about the stimulus range at the
beginning of each trial. Noise levels were comparable to those in Exp. 1 (for S1 we jointly
fit data from all three experiments). Errorbars indicated the 95% confidence interval over
100 bootstrapped samples of the data. See Figure supplement 2.17 for a goodness-of-fit
analysis.
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while the category cues in Experiment 3 were always correct. Consequently, the predicted
bias curves for Experiment 2 only represent trials for which the sensory measurement m was
in favor of the correct judgment (i.e. m was on the correct side of the boundary) whereas
the bias curves for Experiment 3 are computed over all trials. As a result, the biases in
Experiment 3 are smaller for stimulus orientations for which there is a substantial chance
that the noise pushes the measurements m to the other side of the discrimination boundary.
Figure 2.7c shows the fit parameter values for individual subjects. Compared to Experiment 1, the subjective prior widths are substantially smaller and closer to the true stimulus
prior width suggesting that explicitly reminding subjects of the true stimulus distribution
in every trial was effective. As in Experiment 1, subjects showed large variations in subjective noise levels although they consistently were monotonic in actual stimulus noise. Fit
memory noise levels were relatively small with the notable exception of subject S9 whose
poor performance in the estimation task, quite similar to subjects S3 and S5 in Experiment
1, was picked up by the memory noise parameter.

2.4.2. Inconsistent trials
In a small fraction of trials (on average 4%) subjects’ discrimination judgment and their
subsequent orientation estimate were not consistent. We can show that these inconsistent
trials are not a violation of self-consistent inference but rather can be entirely explained
by two common sources of behavioral errors not related to perceptual inference: lapses
and motor noise. In fact, we can accurately predict the estimation patterns and individual
fractions of inconsistent trials based on model fits to the consistent data, and individual
measurements of lapse rates and motor noise.
Figure 2.8a shows the distribution of subjects’ estimates (combined data across all
subjects and all stimulus noise conditions) in inconsistent trials for all three experiments,
together with predictions from the self-consistent observer model for each of the two error
sources. Lapses are defined as trials in which subjects by mistake pushed the wrong button
in the discrimination judgment (respectively, incorrectly remembered the answer cue in
Experiment 3) yet followed up with an orientation estimate that corresponded to their actual
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Figure 2.8: Inconsistent trials are due to lapses and motor noise. (a) Distribution of estimates for the small fraction of inconsistent trials (4% of the data) in each experiment
(across all subjects and stimulus noise conditions). The estimation patterns can be explained as a weighted superposition of two sources of erroneous, non-perceptual behavior:
lapses and motor noise. The self-consistent model well predicts the estimation patterns.
All predictions are based on parameter values taken from the model fit to the consistent
trial data (see Methods section 2.8). Lapse rates were extracted from the psychometric
functions of the discrimination judgment for the total data. Motor noise was measured
in a control experiment (see Figure supplements section 2.8, Figure supplement 2.12). (b)
Quantitative predictions for each subject’s total fraction of inconsistent trials are compared
to the measured fractions. Predictions for the combined subjects suggest that inconsistent
trials are mainly due to lapses.
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judgment. For Experiments 1 and 2, the predicted estimation patterns for lapse trials are
similar to the predictions for consistent trials (Figs. 2.3c, 2.5c), which makes sense since we
assumed that subjects performed the estimation task correctly (i.e. were self-consistent)
but mistakenly pushed the wrong button in the discrimination task. For Experiment 3,
the pattern is different because the misremembered answer cue is always incorrect, and
thus subjects estimates are based on the long tail of the sensory measurement distribution.
In contrast, motor noise leads to inconsistent trials when it accidentally deflects subjects’
reported orientation estimates to the other side of the discrimination boundary. Thus for all
experiments they are predicted to be limited to stimulus orientations close to the boundary.
A visual comparison between the measured and the predicted estimation pattern (Fig. 2.8a)
confirms that the small fraction of inconsistent trials are qualitatively well explained as the
combined effect of errors due to lapses and motor noise. Furthermore, we can quantitatively
predict individual subjects’ overall fraction of inconsistent trials based on their fit model
parameter values, and measured lapse rates and motor noise (Fig. 2.8b). Analyzing the
contribution of each error source further reveals that the majority of inconsistent trials are
caused by lapses in the discrimination task.

2.4.3. Explaining existing experimental data
In a recent study, Zamboni et al. (2016) run different variations of the original experiment
(Jazayeri and Movshon, 2007). Specifically, they manipulated the presence and orientation
of the discrimination boundary at the time of the estimation task, as well as whether
subjects had to explicitly perform the discrimination task or not. We fit our model to this
dataset (combined subject) and the results are shown in Fig. 2.9. Experiment 1a was an
exact replica of the original experiment (Jazayeri and Movshon, 2007). The observed bias
patterns are consistent with the original results as well as the results from our Experiment
1, and thus well accounted for by our model (Fig. 2.9a). Experiment 1b was identical to
1a except that the discrimination boundary was removed right after subjects performed
the discrimination task. This manipulation led to an increase in variance and a loss of
bimodality in the distribution of estimates (Fig. 2.9b). Interestingly, however, the data
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Figure 2.9: Model fits for experimental data by Zamboni et al. (2016). (a) Experiment 1a:
Exact replication of the original experiment Jazayeri and Movshon (2007). Exemplarily
shown is the estimation data (combined subject) at one stimulus coherence level (0.13)
together with our model fit. (b) Experiment 1b was identical except that the boundary was
not shown during the estimation task. Estimate distributions are no longer bimodal yet the
self-consistent observer, relying on a noisy memory of the boundary orientation, consistently
better fit the data than the strictly unimodal, independent observer model (log-likelihood
difference). (c) Experiment 2 introduced a shift in the boundary orientation right before
the estimation task, which subjects were not aware of (± 6 degrees). Subjects’ estimates
were shifted accordingly (combined subject). The self-consistent model can account for the
shift if we assume that the conditional prior is applied to the shifted boundary orientation.
See Fig. 2.9–figure supplement 2.18-2.20 for distributions, fits, and goodness-of-fits for all
conditions.
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are consistently better fit by the self-consistent model than by the independent model that
strictly predicts a unimodal distribution, if we assume that the observer had to rely on a
noisy memory representation of the discrimination boundary for the estimation task. A
detailed inspection of the estimate distributions shows that they are wider the closer the
stimulus direction is to the boundary and generally skewed towards the boundary. This
suggests that subjects behaved according to the self-consistent observer model, yet the
characteristic bimodal estimation pattern is hidden in the extra variance introduced by the
uncertainty about the boundary orientation.
In Experiment 2, the boundary orientation was shifted by a small amount (± 6 degrees)
before subjects had to perform the estimation task. Introducing a short blank screen right
before the shift ensured that subjects were not aware of this manipulation. In contrast to
Experiment 1, subjects were only asked to perform the estimation task. Subjects’ estimates
still show the same characteristic bimodal distribution although they are shifted according
to the boundary shift. This suggests that subjects implicitly performed the discrimination
task even though they were not asked to report an explicit judgment, which is supported
by the good model fit (Fig. 2.9c). Based on these results, we conclude that self-consistent
inference takes place at the time of the estimation task, can occur on memorized boundary
information, and does not require an explicit discrimination judgment.

2.5. Self-consistency despite memory degradation
To what degree is self-consistent inference a necessary condition for self-consistent behavior?
If working memory were perfect (i.e. the sensory signal m and its memory recall mm are
identical) then any reasonable observer model would be self-consistent. However, this is
an unlikely scenario because it is fairly well established that continuous visual information
is degrading rather quickly over time in working memory (Wilken and Ma, 2004; Bays
et al., 2011). We thus expect working memory degradation to affect perceptual behavior,
in particular in Experiments 1 and 2 where the average time between stimulus presentation
and the estimation task was on the order of 2-3 seconds. This is supported by the model fits
that revealed non-zero memory noise levels. In order to quantify how challenging working
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memory noise is for maintaining self-consistency, we computed the fractions of inconsistent
trials that we would expect without self-consistent inference, based on the fit memory noise
levels.
Figure 2.10a shows the predicted fractions of inconsistent trials as a function of stimulus
orientation for every subject and stimulus noise condition. The curves reflect the fraction
of trials in which the sensory measurement m and the working memory recall mm are on
different sides of the decision boundary. Predictions vary for individual subjects yet are
typically large in particular for orientations close to the boundary.
A comparison with the actually observed fractions of inconsistent trials in Experiments
1 and 2 reveals that those are much smaller and relatively independent of the stimulus
orientation (combined subject for statistical reasons; Fig. 2.10b), in line with our previous
conclusion that inconsistent trials predominantly reflect lapses (see Fig. 2.8). This is further
supported by a comparison with subjects’ individual memory noise levels: the predicted
fractions are almost perfectly correlated with memory noise whereas no such correlation
can be found for the observed fractions (Fig. 2.10c). Thus, above analysis suggests that if
memory noise is present, the proposed self-consistency constraint is necessary in order to
account for the low fractions of inconsistent trials in the data.

2.6. Alternative interpretations
While various dependencies in sequential perceptual choice tasks have been reported, such
as dependencies between decision outcomes (Fernberger, 1920; Senders and Sowards, 1952;
Gold et al., 2008; Fründ et al., 2014; Abrahamyan et al., 2016), decision confidence (Rahnev et al., 2015; Fleming and Daw, 2017), reaction times (Laming, 1979; Link, 1975), and
error rates (Vervaeck and Boer, 1980), the impact of subjects’ choices on their immediate
subsequent perceptual judgments has not yet been considered a cause for sequential dependencies. Notably, Jazayeri and Movshon (2007) interpreted the reported post-decision
biases as the result of a selective read-out strategy by which the brain preferentially weighs
signals from those sensory neurons that are most informative with respect to the discrimination task, yet is then compelled to use the same weighted read-out signal when performing
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Figure 2.10: Maintaining self-consistency in the face of working memory noise. (a) Shown
are the predicted fractions of inconsistent trials if orientation estimates are not conditioned
on the preceding judgment. These are trials for which the sensory signal m and its memory recall mm are on different sides of the discrimination boundary. Using the fit model
parameters from Exp. 1 and 2, each line represents the fraction of inconsistent trials as
a function of stimulus orientation for every subject (color code on the right). Each panel
is for one of the three stimulus noise conditions. These large fractions are predicted for
any non-trivial model whose discrimination judgment is based on m and the estimate on
mm but does not condition the estimation process on the preceding discrimination judgment. For simplicity, we did not include lapses and motor error for this analysis and thus
these predictions reflect the direct consistency benefit of conditioning the estimate on the
preceding discrimination judgment. (b) The actual fractions of inconsistent trials are much
lower and relatively independent of stimulus orientation as they are mostly due to lapses
(see Fig. 2.8b); shown is the combined subject. (c) The benefit of self-consistent inference
is substantial for larger memory noise; predicted fractions are almost perfectly correlated
with the fit memory noise σm of individual subjects. In comparison, the actual fractions
of inconsistent trials are uncorrelated with memory noise levels, in line with our previous
analysis showing that they are mainly due to lapses and motor noise.
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the subsequent estimation task. They conclude that a non-uniform read-out profile that
more strongly weighs neurons with preferred tuning slightly away from the discrimination
boundary could explain the repulsive bias patterns. This is a more mechanistic, neural
interpretation, which complicates a direct comparison with our normative computational
model. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference between this interpretation and
our self-consistent model in the way how it assumes the two perceptual tasks to interact:
the read-out model proposes a feed-forward process where both tasks are performed independently based on the same weighted sensory signal, whereas our model assumes that
feed-back of the categorical judgment is causally affecting the estimation process. Despite
this difference, our experimental results alone may not be sufficient to disambiguate between
these two interpretations. Experiments 2 and 3 were foremost designed to test the specific
aspects of our self-consistent observer model. Although subjects’ behavior in these experiments is not compatible with the originally proposed rationale for the particular shape
of the read-out profile (i.e. optimized for the discrimination task - Jazayeri and Movshon
(2007)), relaxing this assumption by also allowing stimulus prior information to determine
the shape of the profile may lead to an alternative explanation of our data. Future work
must show whether this is true or not. It seems important that such work can establish a
principled description of how stimulus prior information ought to be reflected in the weighting function, otherwise the model’s explanatory power will be reduced to that of a curve
fit. It seems also important that any potential model assessment takes full advantage of the
richness of the behavioral data, i.e. models should be evaluated based on their ability to
account for the entire distribution of subjects’ discrimination-estimation response pairs, and
not only on summary statistics such as mean bias (Jazayeri and Movshon, 2007; Zamboni
et al., 2016).
More challenging to reconcile with the read-out model, or any other model that does not
impose some form of self-consistency constraint, are the experimental results by Zamboni
et al. (2016) in combination with our consistency analysis (Fig. 2.9). The results by Zamboni
et al. (2016) suggest that a different (or at least adjusted) read-out profile must be applied at
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the time of the estimation task, which implies that the sensory signal up to that point needed
to be stored in some form of working memory. With working memory quickly deteriorating
over time (Wilken and Ma, 2004; Bays et al., 2011), our consistency analysis shows that
the observed degree of trial consistency cannot be achieved by an observer model that does
not condition the estimate on the discrimination judgment (Fig. 2.9). Future research is
necessary to validate the levels of working memory noise we have determined with our
model.

2.7. Discussion
We have shown that in a discrimination-estimation task sequence, the estimated value of a
stimulus variable is systematically biased by the preceding discrimination judgment about
that variable. We have introduced a self-consistent Bayesian observer model that provides
an accurate and complete description of perceptual behavior in such sequential decisionmaking. The model assumes that the estimates are the result of a Bayesian inference
process over a hierarchical generative model, which, however, is conditioned not only on
the sensory evidence but also on the subject’s judgment in the preceding discrimination
task. This guarantees that discrimination judgments and estimates in any given trial are
consistent even when the observer must rely on working memory signals that are noisy.
We show that an observer that considers the tasks independently will substantially fail to
provide the level of consistency observed in the data. With a set of targeted psychophysical
experiments we verified that the observed bias pattern generalizes for different low-level
visual stimuli (Experiment 1), and validated the self-consistent model by showing that
the pattern indeed depends on subjects’ knowledge of the stimulus prior (Experiment 2)
and that subjects use their own decision as if it was correct (Experiment 3). We further
validated the model with existing data from experiments that manipulated the presence and
orientation of the discrimination boundary. Successful fits of the proposed observer model to
individual subjects data across the various experiments demonstrate the power and accuracy
of the model, and its ability to generalize across experimental conditions. Furthermore, the
model fits provide a meaningful interpretation of the substantial between-subject differences
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in behavior in terms of individual differences in noise levels and knowledge of the stimulus
prior.
Our results and in particular the proposed self-consistent inference model have broad
implications for understanding human decision-making in general. For example, subjects
did not distinguish between a decision outcome they generated themselves and a decision
outcome that was given to them (see section 2.4.1), which implies that for the purpose
of performing the estimation task they treat their own subjective judgment as if it was
correct. Computationally, this is interesting because on one hand it apparently seems to
violates optimal behavior in terms of overall perceptual accuracy (obviously, a subjective
judgment can be wrong). On the other hand, however, it guarantees that the observer
remains self-consistent throughout the task sequence even when noise is corrupting the
sensory information in working memory (Fig. 2.10). This is consistent with previous results
showing that selectively discarding evidence (a seemingly irrational behavior) can improve
performance when decision formation is corrupted by internal neural noise (Tsetsos et al.,
2016), and thus may be rational after all. Future work is needed to investigate in more detail
the impact of self-consistent inference on choice performance and perceptual accuracy.

2.8. Method and supplementary material
Methods
Experimental setup
Ten subjects with normal or correct-to-normal vision (6 males, 4 females; one non-naı̈ve)
participated in the experiments. One subject (male) was excluded from the analysis because
he failed to correctly execute the estimation task. All subjects provided informed consent.
The experiments were approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of
Pennsylvania under protocol #819634.
General methods: Subjects sat in a dimmed room in front of a special purpose computer
monitor (VIEWPixx3D, refresh rate of 120 Hz and resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels). Viewing distance was 83.5 cm and enforced with a chin rest. We programmed all experiments
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in Matlab (Mathworks, Inc.) using the MGL toolbox (http://justingardner.net/mgl) for
stimulus generation and presentation. The code was run on an Apple Mac Pro computer
with Quad-Core Intel Xeon 2.93 GHz, 8GB RAM. Subjects were asked to fixate at the
fixation dot whenever it appeared on the screen. Before subjects did the main experiments,
they had 2-3 training sessions during which they familiarized themselves with the discrimination and the estimation task. After that, every subject either completed 1800 trials in
3-4 sessions for Experiment 1 or completed 3600 trials in 6-8 sessions for Experiment 2 and
3. This is equivalent to 40 trials per every one of the 15 stimulus orientations and the
three noise conditions. Sessions lasted approximately 50 minutes. Subjects used a gamepad
(Sony PS4 Dualshock) as input device: they reported their decision in the discrimination
task by pressing the appropriate trigger button (left for ’ccw’, right for ’cw’), and used the
analog joystick of the gamepad to indicate their perceived stimulus orientation by adjusting
a reference line and then confirming their estimate with an additional button press. Screen
background luminance was 40 cd/m2 and mean stimulus luminance was 49 cd/m2 .
Experiment 1: Five subjects (S1-5) participated in Experiment 1. In each trial, subjects
viewed a white fixation dot (diameter: 0.3o ) and two black marks (length: 3o , distance
from fixation: 3.5o ) indicating a discrimination boundary whose orientation was randomly
chosen around the circle. After 1300 ms, the orientation stimulus consisting of an array of
white line segments (length: 0.6o ) was presented for 500 ms. The array consisted of two
concentric circles of lines centered on the fixation: the outer (diameter: 3.8o ) contained
16 line segments and the inner (diameter: 1.8o ) contained 8 line segments. Small random
variations (from −0.15o to 0.15o ) were independently added to the x-y coordinates of each
line segment. The orientation of every line segment was drawn from a Gaussian distribution
with mean given as one of 15 stimulus orientations relative to the boundary (from −21o to
21o in steps of 3o ) and standard deviation σ as one of 3 values (0o , 6o and 18o ). After the
stimulus disappeared, subjects were asked to indicate whether the overall orientation of the
array was clockwise or counter-clockwise relative to the boundary. If subjects responded
within 4 seconds, they then were also asked to indicate their perceived stimulus orientation.
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Otherwise the current trial was skipped and added to the back of the trial list. Every trial
was followed by a randomly chosen inter-trial interval of 300 ms to 600 ms duration (blank
screen; mean luminance).
Experiment 2: Five subjects (S1 and S6-9) participated in Experiment 2. The procedure
was identical to Experiment 1 except that at the beginning of every trial, subjects were
reminded of the stimulus distribution by presenting a prior cue consisting of a gray arc
for 800 ms. The arc (width: 0.2o , eccentricity from fixation: 3.5o ) spanned the range
±21o relative to the discrimination boundary indicating the total true stimulus distribution.
Subjects were instructed that stimulus orientation was guaranteed to occur anywhere within
this range with equal probability.
Experiment 3: The same five subjects that participated in Experiment 2 also participated in Experiment 3. The procedure was identical to Experiment 2 except for the
following: First, the prior cue was present only for 500 ms, after which it was reduced to a
colored arc that only spanned the orientation range at the side of the discrimination boundary where the stimulus orientation in this trial would occur. This colored cue indicated
the correct answer (’cw’ or ’ccw’) and was shown for 300ms. Its color (red or green) was
randomly assigned and uncorrelated with the stimulus orientation. Second, instead of the
orientation discrimination task, subjects were tasked to recall the color of the cue.
Control Experiment (Motor noise): As part of the training, all subjects participated in a
control experiment that allowed us to estimate subjects’ individual motor noise levels. They
were first presented with a fixation dot and boundary black marks (like in Experiment 1-3).
After that, they were presented with an orientation stimulus consisting of a single white
line (like the reference line in Experiment 1-3, see e.g. Fig. 2.1a) for 500 ms. They then
had to reproduce the stimulus by adjusting said reference line with the analog joystick of
the gamepad . After subjects pressed a button to confirm their response, they received
feedback in form of a green reference line indicating the true stimulus orientation. This
control experiment consisted of 600 trials. The boundary orientation was uniformly sampled
around the circle. The stimulus orientation was uniformly distributed around the boundary
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as in Experiment 1-3. We used the measured standard deviation σ0 in subjects’ estimates as
a direct measure of subjects’ individual motor noise levels. Fig. 2.3–figure supplement 2.12
shows the measured σ0 for all 9 subjects. We used these measured levels as fixed parameters
in all our model fits and predictions, assuming that motor noise is Gaussian and is uniform
and independent of the reproduced orientation relative to the discrimination boundary.
Self-consistent Bayesian observer model
The model is formulated as an observer that performs Bayesian inference over the hierarchical generative model shown in Fig. 2.2a. The observer is assumed to solve the two
perceptual inference tasks in sequence: the observer first judges whether the stimulus orientation was clockwise (cw) or counter-clockwise (ccw) of a random discrimination boundary,
and then performs an estimate of the actual stimulus orientation. The key feature of the
model is that the inference process associated with the estimate is conditioned on the observer’s preceding categorical judgment. As such, the observer treats their own, subjective
categorical judgment as if it was a correct statement about the stimulus (see Experiment
3). In the following we describe the Bayesian formalism of this conditioned task sequence.
Discrimination judgment: Let θ be the true stimulus orientation relative to the
discrimination boundary, m the noisy sensory measurement of the stimulus orientation at
presentation, and C = {’cw’, ’ccw’} the categorical decision variable indicating whether
the stimulus orientation is clockwise (cw) or counter-clockwise (ccw) of the discrimination
boundary. Assuming a symmetric loss structure (i.e. no benefit for one correct decision
over the other), the observer solves the categorical decision task by picking the category
with maximal posterior probability given the sensory measurement m, thus

Ĉ(m) = argmaxC∈{’cw’,’ccw’} p(C|m) .

(2.1)

The decision process Ĉ(m) is a deterministic mapping from any particular m to either one
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of the two categories. The posterior distribution p(C|m) is given as

p(C|m) ∝ p(m|C)p(C) ,

(2.2)

where p(C) is the prior probability and p(m|C) the likelihood over the choices. We can
obtain this likelihood by marginalizing the stimulus likelihood over all stimulus orientations,
that is
π

Z

p(m|θ)p(θ|C)dθ .

p(m|C) =

(2.3)

−π

The stimulus likelihood is fully determined by the noise characteristics of the sensory measurement m, thus by the distribution p(m|θ) of sensory measurements m for any given true
stimulus orientation θ. Finally, the model’s prediction of the psychometric function in the
decision task is obtained by marginalizing the posterior (Eq. (2.2)) for a particular choice
(e.g. “Fraction reported cw” - see Fig. 2.2b) over the sensory measurement distribution,
Z
p(Ĉ = ’cw’|θ) =

p(Ĉ = ’cw’|m)p(m|θ)dm .

(2.4)

Estimation task: Following the categorical judgment, the observer then solves the
estimation task by computing the mean of the posterior distribution (i.e. assuming a loss
function that minimizes squared error) over θ. In contrast to the independent observer, however, we assume that the posterior probability is conditioned on the observer’s own choice
Ĉ in the preceding categorical decision task. Because the stimulus has long disappeared by
the time the subject performs the estimation task (see experimental design), we formulate
the posterior on a memorized version of the sensory measurement. With mm referring to
a noisy recall sample from working memory of the measurement m (doubly stochastic) we
write the optimal conditioned estimate as
Z

π

θ̂(mm , Ĉ) =

θp(θ|mm , Ĉ)dθ ,
−π
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(2.5)

with the posterior
p(θ|mm , Ĉ) =

p(mm |θ, Ĉ)p(θ|Ĉ)
p(mm |Ĉ)

.

(2.6)

The estimate θ̂(mm , Ĉ), even though the result of Bayesian inference, describes a deterministic mapping from any particular mm to an estimate. However, we obtain two different
formulations for the estimate, one for each potential categorical judgment3 .
With Eq. (2.5) the distribution of the estimates can be computed based on the distribution of the memorized sensory measurement
Z
p(mm |θ, Ĉ) =

p(mm |m)p(m|θ, Ĉ(m))dm .

(2.7)

Note that the above marginalization is limited to measurements m that led to the particular
categorical judgment Ĉ(m) (as given by Eq. (2.2)).
The model’s description of the conditioned distribution of the estimates p(θ̂|θ, Ĉ) is obtained by a variable transformation for the conditional measurement distribution p(mm |θ, Ĉ),
i.e. substituting mm with the estimate θ̂(mm , Ĉ) (Eq. (2.5)). Finally, the model’s prediction of the entire distribution of the estimates p(θ̂|θ) (i.e. the density plots shown in e.g.
Fig. 2.2c) is given by marginalizing over the decision outcomes, thus

p(θ̂|θ) =

X

p(θ̂|θ, Ĉ)p(Ĉ|θ) .

(2.8)

Ĉ

Estimation task with known correct category assignment (Experiment 3):
If the observer knows the category assignment upfront (as in Experiment 3), the above
formulation of solving the estimation task slightly changes in that Eqs. (2.5)–(2.8) are
conditioned on the actual correct category assignment C rather than a the inferred category
Ĉ. In particular, this changes the marginalization over m in Eq. (2.7) such that it is
no longer limited to values of m that are consistent with a desired category assignment
(according to Ĉ(m)), and also Eq. (2.8) where the sum is over the actual binary category
3
In general, there are as many different versions for the estimate as there are potential choices in the
categorical judgment task.
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probability p(C|θ) rather than the inferred probability p(Ĉ|θ). As a result, the predicted
biases with identical model parameters are slightly smaller when the observer knows the
correct category assignment compared to when the category has to be inferred first.
Specific assumptions defining the generative model: We made the following
specific assumptions in defining the components of the generative model (Fig. 2.2a):
• We set the category prior p(C) = 0.5 for both values of C since the two choices are
equally likely in all our experiments.
• The categorical stimulus prior p(θ|C) was assumed to reflect subjects’ individual expectations about the experimental distribution of stimulus orientations. We modeled
this prior to be identical but mirrored around the discrimination boundary for the
two choices. More specifically, we assumed it to be uniform over the angle α relative
to the boundary with a smooth cosine fall-off from the uniform density value to zero
over the additional angle β. We then defined the prior width wp (see Figs. 2.4b, 2.7c)
as the total angle relative to the boundary where the prior density decreased to half
of its uniform value, that is wp = (α + 2/3β).
• We assumed the sensory measurements m to reflect noisy samples of the true stimulus
orientation θ, with p(m|θ) to be a Gaussian with mean θ and standard deviation σs
that is monotonically depending on the array distribution width σ of the orientation
stimulus. Although σs was assumed to be subject dependent and thus a free parameter, we assumed that across experiments σs was the same for a given subject and
stimulus noise condition.
• We treat the sensory evidence in the estimation task mm as being a sample from a
Gaussian with mean m (original sensory measurement) and standard deviation σm .
We assume that σm is independent of stimulus uncertainty yet can be individually
different for different subjects.
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Independent Bayesian observer model
The “independent” observer model, as defined in our paper, is formulated on the same
generative model as the self-consistent observer model (Fig. 2.3a) and thus has identical
model parameters. The only formal differences are that
• the posterior over stimulus orientation is not conditioned on the discrimination judgment Ĉ (as in Eq. (2.6)), thus

p(θ|mm ) =

p(mm |θ)p(θ)
p(mm )

with p(θ) =

X

p(θ|C)p(C) ,

(2.9)

C

• marginalization over the memorized sensory signal is not limited to measurements
that are in agreement with a particular discrimination judgment Ĉ (as in Eq. (2.7)),
thus
Z
p(mm |θ) =

p(mm |m)p(m|θ)dm .

(2.10)

Having the same parameters as the self-consistent observer model allows a direct loglikelihood comparison in judging the goodness-of-fit.
Model fits
We jointly fit the model to the data of both the decision and estimation task by maximizing
the likelihood of the model given the data:

p(D|ρ) =

n
Y
i=1

P (Di |ρ) =

n
Y

P (Ĉi |ρ, θ)p(θ̂i |Ĉi , ρ, θ)

(2.11)

i=1

where D is the data, ρ represents the parameters of the model, θ is the true orientation,
Ĉi is the decision outcome, θ̂i is the orientation estimate, i is the trial index and n is the
number of trials.
For all fits, we only excluded trials with inconsistent response pairs (i.e. trial in which
subjects discrimination judgment and estimate where not consistent in terms of their categorical identity; approximately 4% of the trials.). As we demonstrate (Fig. 2.8), the fractions
Go to Table of Contents

44

and the bias characteristics of these inconsistent trials can be fully predicted based on the
fit model parameters to the consistent data by assuming that they are caused by motor
noise and lapses (Fig. 2.8).
Subjects’ motor noise was accounted for by assuming that the recorded orientation
estimates follow the distributions of estimates p(θ̂|θ) (Eq. (2.8)) convolved with the motor
noise kernel. We assume motor noise to be Gaussian with a standard deviation σ0 that was
individually determined for each subject from the control experiment (see above). Motor
noise levels across subjects were fairly similar with an average σ0 = 4.3 degrees. Fig. 2.3–
figure supplement 2.12 shows measured noise levels for all subjects.
Our model fit contained a total of 6 free parameters:
• standard deviations σs for the 3 noise levels of the stimuli (additive Gaussian noise).
• standard deviation σm for memory noise (additive Gaussian).
• two parameters α, β for the prior distribution over stimulus orientation, defining its
uniform range and smoothness, respectively.
The Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm was used to minimize the term −log(p(D|ρ)).
Twenty iterations of the optimization procedure were performed using randomized initial
parameter values in order to obtain the best fitting model.
Model fit to data by Zamboni et al. (2016)
Experiment 1: For the condition where the decision boundary was always present, we fit
the data with exactly the same model assumptions as we used for fitting the data from our
Experiment 1. We added motor noise as a free parameter because Zamboni et al. (2016)
did not use a control experiment to determine the motor noise. For the condition where
the decision boundary was removed after subjects did the discrimination task, we assumed
that the observer had to rely on a noisy memory recall of the true boundary orientation
θb when performing the estimation task. As a result, the conditioned prior varies in every
trial depending on that memory recall. We assumed the recalled orientation to be Gaussian
distributed around the true boundary orientation with a standard deviation σb that was a
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free parameter. Because the same group of subjects run both versions of the experiments,
we first fit the self-consistent model to the data from the boundary-present condition and
then used those parameters to fit the data in the boundary-absent condition with the only
free parameter being σb (Fig. 2.9–figure supplement 2.18). When computing the goodnessof-fit (Fig. 2.9–figure supplement 2.20) we assumed the independent observer model to have
the same additional noise parameter σb .
Experiment 2: Although the discrimination boundary was present throughout the entire
trial, subjects were only asked to perform the estimation task. Furthermore, unknown to the
subjects, the decision boundary was either kept the same or shifted 6 degrees (cw or ccw).
For our model fit, we assumed that subjects, even not explicitly asked to do so, implicitly
performed the discrimination task and then subsequently conditioned the estimation process
on that implicit decision as described by the proposed self-consistent observer model. Thus
we fit the data with exactly the same model assumptions used to fit the data from our
Experiment 1, with the addition that for the conditions where the decision boundary was
shifted, the conditioned prior was shifted accordingly. The fits shown in Fig. 2.9, Fig. 2.9–
figure supplement 2.19 are joint fits to data from all three shifted conditions.
Code availability
Computer code (MATLAB) providing model simulations for all three experiments is freely
available at https://github.com/cpc-lab-stocker/Self-consistent-model (Luu and Stocker,
2018).
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Figure supplements
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Figure 2.11: Full distributions of individual subjects’ estimates in Experiment 1. Each row
corresponds to one of the three stimulus noise conditions (color-code as in main text).
Nulla malesuada porttitor diam. Donec felis erat, congue non, volutpat at, tincidunt
tristique, libero. Vivamus viverra fermentum felis. Donec nonummy pellentesque ante.
Phasellus adipiscing semper elit. Proin fermentum massa ac quam. Sed diam turpis, molestie vitae, placerat a, molestie nec, leo. Maecenas lacinia. Nam ipsum ligula, eleifend
at, accumsan nec, suscipit a, ipsum. Morbi blandit ligula feugiat magna. Nunc eleifend
consequat lorem. Sed lacinia nulla vitae enim. Pellentesque tincidunt purus vel magna.
Integer non enim.
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Figure 2.12: Measured motor noise of individual subjects. Shown are the extracted values of
the standard deviation σ0 in subjects’ estimates in the control experiment (see Methods).
These individual values were used in modeling the data from Experiment 1-3, assuming
that motor noise was Gaussian distributed.
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Noise level:
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Figure 2.13: Histogram plots of the orientation estimates together with the model fit for
Experiment 1 (combined subject). Each row is for one of the three stimulus noise conditions.
Note, this figure corresponds to Fig. 2.2c in the main text.
Nulla malesuada porttitor diam. Donec felis erat, congue non, volutpat at, tincidunt
tristique, libero. Vivamus viverra fermentum felis. Donec nonummy pellentesque ante.
Phasellus adipiscing semper elit. Proin fermentum massa ac quam. Sed diam turpis, molestie vitae, placerat a, molestie nec, leo. Maecenas lacinia. Nam ipsum ligula, eleifend
at, accumsan nec, suscipit a, ipsum. Morbi blandit ligula feugiat magna. Nunc eleifend
consequat lorem. Sed lacinia nulla vitae enim. Pellentesque tincidunt purus vel magna. Integer non enim. Nulla malesuada porttitor diam. Donec felis erat, congue non, volutpat at,
tincidunt tristique, libero. Vivamus viverra fermentum felis. Donec nonummy pellentesque
ante. Phasellus adipiscing semper elit. Proin fermentum massa ac quam. Sed diam turpis,
molestie vitae, placerat a, molestie nec, leo. Maecenas lacinia. Nam ipsum ligula, eleifend
at, accumsan nec, suscipit a, ipsum. Morbi blandit ligula feugiat magna. Nunc eleifend
consequat lorem. Sed lacinia nulla vitae enim. Pellentesque tincidunt purus vel magna.
Integer non enim.
Nulla malesuada porttitor diam. Donec felis erat, congue non, volutpat at, tincidunt
tristique, libero. Vivamus viverra fermentum felis. Donec nonummy pellentesque ante.
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Experiment 1
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Figure 2.14: Goodness-of-fits for Experiment 1. Log-likelihood values of the fit self-consistent
observer model for every subject (as well as the combined subject Sc), relative to the
range defined by the likelihoods of the independent Bayesian observer and a hypothetical,
omniscient model (’Data’). The latter can be thought of as the data explaining itself, i.e. a
model ’defined’ by the empirical probabilities of the data. The log-likelihoods of a random
observer (’Chance’) are also given as additional reference. This observer can be thought
of as ’being blind’, thus providing random answers in both the discrimination task and
the estimation task (sampling from a uniform distribution). The self-consistent observer
model is consistently outperforming the independent Bayesian model in explaining the data.
Note, the self-consistent and the independent observer model have exactly the same model
parameters. Also, a version of the self-consistent observer model that does not include noise
in the memory recall of the sensory signal (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2007) generally does not
fit the data as well.
Phasellus adipiscing semper elit. Proin fermentum massa ac quam. Sed diam turpis, molestie vitae, placerat a, molestie nec, leo. Maecenas lacinia. Nam ipsum ligula, eleifend
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at, accumsan nec, suscipit a, ipsum. Morbi blandit ligula feugiat magna. Nunc eleifend
consequat lorem. Sed lacinia nulla vitae enim. Pellentesque tincidunt purus vel magna.
Integer non enim.
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Figure 2.15: Full distributions of individual subjects’ estimates in Experiment 2. Each
row corresponds to one of the three stimulus noise conditions (top-bottom: highest-lowest;
color-code as in main text).
Nulla malesuada porttitor diam. Donec felis erat, congue non, volutpat at, tincidunt
tristique, libero. Vivamus viverra fermentum felis. Donec nonummy
Nulla malesuada porttitor diam. Donec felis erat, congue non, volutpat at, tincidunt
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Experiment 3
40

S1

S6

S7

S8

S9

20
0

Estimated orientation(deg)

-20
-40
40
20
0
-20
-40
40
20
0
-20
-40
-22 -11 0 11 22

-22 -11 0 11 22

-22 -11 0

11 22 -22 -11 0 11 22

Stimulus orientation (deg)

-22 -11 0 11 22

Figure 2.16: Full distributions of individual subjects’ estimates in Experiment 3. Each
row corresponds to one of the three stimulus noise conditions (top-bottom: highest-lowest;
color-code as in main text).
tristique, libero. Vivamus viverra fermentum felis. Donec nonummy pellentesque ante.
Phasellus adipiscing semper elit. Proin fermentum massa ac quam. Sed diam turpis, molestie vitae, placerat a, molestie nec, leo. Maecenas lacinia. Nam ipsum ligula, eleifend at,
accumsan nec, suscipit a, ipsum. Morbi blandit ligula feugiat magna. Nunc eleifend consequat lorem. Sed lacinia nulla vitae enim. Pellentesque tincidunt purus vel magna. Integer
non enim.Sed diam turpis, molestie vitae, placerat a, molestie nec, leo. Maecenas lacinia.
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Figure 2.17: Goodness-of-fits for Experiments 2 and 3. Relative log-likelihood values of
the fit self-consistent observer model for every subject (as well as the combined subject
Sc). Relative scale is defined as described for Fig. 2.4–figure supplement 2.14. The selfconsistent observer model is consistently outperforming the independent Bayesian model
in explaining Experiments 2. For Experiment 3 both models are formally identical; the
marginal differences in likelihood are simply because their fit parameter values slightly
differ because they are from joint fits to data from both Experiment 2 and 3 (subject S1;
joint fit to all three experiments). Note, the self-consistent and the independent observer
model have exactly the same model parameters. Also, a model that does not include noise
in the memory recall of the sensory signal generally does not fit the data as well as the full
self-consistent observer model.
Nam ipsum ligula, eleifend at, accumsan nec, suscipit a, ipsum. Morbi blandit ligula feugiat
magna. Nunc eleifend consequat lorem. Sed lacinia nulla vitae enim. Pellentesque tincidunt
purus vel magna. Integer non enim.
Nulla malesuada porttitor diam. Donec felis erat, congue non, volutpat at, tincidunt
tristique, libero. Vivamus viverra fermentum felis. Donec nonummy pellentesque ante.
Phasellus adipiscing semper elit. Proin fermentum massa ac quam.
Nulla malesuada porttitor diam. Donec felis erat, congue non, volutpat at,
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Figure 2.18: Zamboni et al. (2016) data (Experiment 1, combined subject) and fit with the
self-consistent observer model.
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Figure 2.19: Zamboni et al. (2016) data (Experiment 2, combined subject) and fit with the
self-consistent observer model.
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Figure 2.20: Relative log-likelihoods of model fits for Zamboni et al. (2016) data. Relative
log-likelihood values of the self-consistent observer model fit to the combined subject data for
each experiment. Relative scale is defined as described for Fig. 2.4–figure supplement 2.14.
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Chapter 3
Post-decision sensory representation

3.1. Introduction
I have shown in the previous chapter that human percept of stimulus orientation is systematically biased after having made a categorical decision. The biases were well explained
by a self-consistent Bayesian observer model that downweighs the sensory information inconsistent with the preceding decision. However, it is not clear what is the mechanism underlying the self-consistent inference. One hypothesis is that the sensory representation is
directly modified such that the inconsistent sensory information is completely erased. That
is congruent with several studies showing that making a decision may affect the subsequent
accumulation of sensory evidence (Bronfman et al., 2015; Yu et al., 2015b). Alternatively,
subjects may maintain the full sensory representation and the self-consistent conditioning
happens at the interpretation/decoding of the sensory information. That is congruent with
a study by Peters et al. (2017) that suggests although subjects show self-consistent behavior,
both consistent and inconsistent sensory information are still available in the brain. Along
the same line, several other studies on confidence judgment suggest that sensory evidence
is preserved after a decision (Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010; Meyniel et al., 2015).
In this chapter, I conducted two psychophysics experiments and compared alternative
observer models to test the two hypotheses about the sensory representation in working
memory (Fig. 3.1a). To probe the post-decision sensory representation, I provided feedback to subjects on the decision task before they performed subsequent estimation task.
The results suggest that subjects maintain the full sensory representation of the stimulus.
Interestingly, model analysis indicates that subjects seemed to revise the original sensory
information to make it consistent with the received feedback. That demonstrates the strong
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tendency of the brain to maintain self-consistency along the inferential process.

3.2. Probing post-decision sensory representation
3.2.1. Experimental test and alternative models
In Experiment 1, after being presented with an orientation stimulus, subjects had to indicate
whether the stimulus orientation was clockwise (cw) or counter-clockwise (ccw) relative to
a decision boundary (Fig. 3.1b). After 300 ms, a feedback tone (100% valid) was played
to specify whether subjects’ decision was correct or incorrect. Then subjects had to report
the perceived stimulus orientation, taking into account the feedback. The experiment was
similar to Experiment 1 in chapter 2 except that in the current study, subjects were given
feedback in the decision task and they received a substantial bonus for good performance
in both tasks.
To distinguish between different hypotheses about post-decision sensory representation,
I focused on the critical trials when subjects’ decision was incorrect. In hypothesis 1 (Fig.
3.2a), after making a categorical decision (e.g. ‘cw’), the observer erases the part of sensory
representation that is inconsistent with that decision (the ccw portion). When receiving
feedback specifying that the decision is incorrect, the observer updates the prior on the
stimulus range to make it consistent with the feedback. Here I consider two strategies the
observer may employ to perform the estimation with the modified sensory representation.
For the first strategy (1a-Prior Only), because the observer loses the sensory information on
the correct side, it disregards the remaining sensory information and uses the updated prior
to make an estimation. Specifically, the estimate is the mean of the updated conditional
prior. For the second strategy (1b-Flip Estimate), the observer pretends that the decision
is correct and estimates with the sensory information on the incorrect side. The estimate
is then flipped to the correct side.
In hypothesis 2 (Fig. 3.2b), the observer maintains the full sensory representation after
the categorical decision. Here I also consider two possible strategies the observer may use
to perform the estimation. Both strategies assume the observer updates the conditional
prior based on the feedback. The first strategy (2a-Flip Decision) assumes that the obGo to Table of Contents
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Figure 3.1: Alternative hypotheses of post-decision sensory representation. (a) Hypothesis
1: After the decision task, subjects modify the sensory representation in working memory
and use this modified representation to make the second inference. Hypothesis 2: Subjects
maintain the full sensory representation in working memory and make both decision and
estimation based on this representation. (b) Experiment 1: Stimulus is an array of line
segments whose orientations are sampled from a Gaussian around a stimulus orientation.
The stimulus orientation is sampled uniformly within ± 21 deg of the reference orientation.
Subjects first reported whether the stimulus orientation was clockwise or counter-clockwise
of a decision boundary indicated by two black lines. After 300 ms, they received an auditory
feedback to indicate whether their decision was correct or incorrect. Then they had to take
into account the feedback to estimate the stimulus orientation by adjusting a probe line.
server combines the updated prior with the full sensory representation to estimate stimulus
orientation. In the second strategy (2b-Resample), because the observer knows that the
original sensory measurement is on the incorrect side, it tries to reconstruct a new sensory
measurement that falls on the correct side. More specifically, the observer resamples from a
distribution centered on the original sensory measurement until it gets a sample that is on
the correct side. Then the new sample and the updated prior are used for the estimation.
So the key difference between the two strategies is the sensory sample that is used to make
the inference.
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Figure 3.2: Prediction of alternative hypotheses for incorrect trials. (a) Hypothesis 1: After
making a decision from the sensory representation (illustrated by Gaussian distributions
whose width are proportional to stimulus uncertainty), the observer erases the inconsistent
sensory information by multiplying the conditioned prior with the sensory representation.
Upon receiving feedback indicating that the decision is incorrect, the conditional prior is
updated. Strategy 1a assumes that the observer takes the mean of the updated prior as
the estimate. For strategy 2a, the observer computes the mean of the modified sensory
representation and flipped it to the correct side. (b) Hypothesis 2: The observer preserves
the full sensory representation and updated the conditional prior upon receiving the feedback. Strategy 2a posits that the observer combines the full sensory representation and the
updated prior to make an estimation. In strategy 2b, the observer constructs a resampling
distribution that has the center at the original sensory measurement and has the width
proportional to sensory uncertainty. It then draws samples from this distribution until a
sample falls on the correct side. This sample is then used to make an estimation.
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3.2.2. Some sensory information is still preserved
To test the prediction of the above strategies, I first fit the self-consistent Bayesian observer
model (Fig. 3.3a) jointly to all data in the decision task and data for correct trials in the
estimation task. The model is the same as the one in Experiment 1, chapter 2. The only
difference is that for the current experiment, I only fit the correct trials for the estimation
data.
Then I implemented the above strategies using the fit parameters to predict incorrect
trials in the estimation task. Note that this is a prediction with no free parameter and
the models can predict the full distribution of subjects’ estimates in the incorrect trials. A
qualitative comparison between the model prediction and the data shows a few noteworthy
features (Fig. 3.4). Because the Prior Only model (1a) is independent of sensory noise, it
predicts that the estimation distribution is the same across the two stimulus noise levels.
The slight difference is due to different proportions of incorrect trials in the decision task. In
contrast, the data (combined subject, n=5) show that the estimates have larger means and
larger variances for higher noise levels. The remaining three models seem to qualitatively
capture this pattern in the data. A closer examination of the three models shows that
the Flip Estimate (1b) and the Resample (2b) models can better capture the magnitude
of subjects’ estimates, especially for high noise condition. On the other hand, the Flip
Decision (2a) and the Resample (2b) models can better account for the overall trend in
subjects’ estimates which is roughly constant with a slight increase in magnitude when the
stimulus is farther away from the decision boundary. However, the data are too sparse for
those stimulus orientations to draw a definitive conclusion.
I used two different metrics to quantitatively compare the models. First, because the
models can predict the full estimate distribution, I can compute the likelihood of each model
given the data. I also obtained the fit parameters for each individual subject so that I can
compare the models at the level of individual subject (Fig. 3.5a). To get a sense of how well
the models perform in absolute term, I also consider the oracle model which was derived
from the empirical distribution of the data. That serves as the absolute upper bound on the
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Figure 3.3: Self-consistent model fit to correct trials. (a) In each trial, a sensory measurement m is made from the stimulus orientation θ. The observer uses this measurement to
make a categorical decision Ĉ. By the time the observer performs the estimation, the sensory measurement is further degraded in working memory which results in a sample mm .
Given this sample and the conditional prior p(θ|Ĉ), the observer estimates the stimulus
orientation. (b) Model fit to subjects’ decision (combined subject, n=5). Green circles indicate the data and purple lines indicate the model fit. Darker shade represents low stimulus
noise. As expected, the slope of the psychometric function is steeper for lower noise level.
(c) Model fit to the estimation data. Subjects show the characteristic biases away from
the decision boundary as observed in Chapter 2. The model can capture this bias pattern
well. The data and model are shown for correct trials only which explains why there is no
estimate in the upper left and lower right regions. Note that the model was jointly fit to
the decision and estimation data.
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Figure 3.4: Data and model prediction for incorrect trials. (a) Distribution of subjects’
estimates in incorrect trials. Each row corresponds to a stimulus noise level (upper: low
noise). The data is sparse when the stimulus orientation is further away from the decision
boundary and the stimulus noise is low because subjects made less incorrect decisions.
The mean of subjects’ estimate is roughly constant on each side of the decision boundary.
Also, the mean and variance of the estimate are larger for higher noise level. (b) The
Prior Only model predicts a constant estimate on each side of the boundary. Variation
in the model’s estimates is only due to motor noise which is the same across all stimulus
conditions. Therefore, the estimates’ mean and variance are the same across two stimulus
noises. In contrast, the remaining three models predict larger mean and variance for higher
stimulus noise. However, the Flip Decision model tends to underestimate the magnitude
of subjects’ estimates, especially in the high noise condition. Moreover, the Flip Estimate
model predicts decreasing estimate magnitude when stimulus orientation is further away
from 0 which is opposite to the overall trend in the data.
model performance. The result is quite consistent across individual subjects and concordant
with the above qualitative comparison between models (Fig. 3.5b). First, the Prior Only
model is worse than other models by a large margin. Second, although the Resample model
has the highest log likelihood, its likelihood value is not significantly higher than the Flip
Estimate and the Flip Decision models. Moreover, bootstrapping the model likelihood
also indicates that the Prior Only model is statistically inferior to other models while the
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three models Flip Estimate, Flip Decision and Resample are statistically indistinguishable.
In the second metric to assess model performance, I computed the mean estimates in each
condition for each model and then calculated the correlation and mean squared error (MSE)
between model predictions and data. Although the correlations are pretty high and similar
across models (0.74-0.82), MSE of the Prior Only model is remarkably higher than the
other models (110 vs. 10, 29 and 8). That is clearly observed in the scatter plot of model
prediction and data (Fig. 3.5c). Hence the MSE metric also corresponds well with the log
likelihood metric and the qualitative analysis.
The above analyses are quite consistent and show that I can rule out the Prior Only
model. Because the Prior Only model is the only model that doesn’t use any sensory information in the estimation whereas other models do to a certain extent, it suggests subjects
still maintain some sensory information when performing the estimation task. However,
the analyses cannot clearly dissociate the three models Flip Estimate, Flip Decision and
Resample. Therefore, I conducted Experiment 2 to better distinguish those models.

3.3. Further test of alternative models
3.3.1. Imposing asymmetric prior
Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1 except for three differences. First, the stimulus
noise for low noise condition was slightly higher in Experiment 2. Second, the stimulus
range in Experiment 2 was asymmetric around the reference (12 deg on the CCW side and
30 deg on the CW side) whereas the stimulus range in Experiment 1 was symmetric (21 deg
on both sides). Third, the subjects were trained to learn this asymmetric stimulus range
and were explicitly reminded about the range at the beginning of each trial (Fig. 3.6a). If
the subjects could learn this asymmetric prior, the distribution of subjects’ estimates will
be shifted towards the CW side for correct trials (Fig. 3.6b). Given this learned prior, the
models make markedly different predictions for incorrect trials (Fig. 3.6c). Specifically, the
Flip Estimate model predicts a shift in the estimation distribution towards the CCW side.
In contrast, the Flip Decision and Resample models predict a shift towards the CW side.
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Figure 3.5: Performance of alternative models in Experiment 1. (a) The fit noise and prior
range show substantial variation across individual subjects. However, it is consistent across
subjects that the fit sensory noise increases with stimulus noise and all subjects tend to
overestimate the true stimulus range (± 21 deg around the decision boundary). Overall,
memory noise is relatively small compared to sensory noise. (b) Normalized log likelihood of
the models. Log likelihood values are normalized so that the oracle model (data explaining
itself) has a value of 1 and the Prior Only model has a value of 0. It is consistent across
all subjects that the Prior Only model performs substantially worse than other models and
the Resample model is the best. However, except for subject 4, the performances of Flip
Estimate, Flip Decision and Resample models are not statistically different. (c) Scatter
plots compare the mean estimates between model and data. Each point corresponds to
one experimental condition (stimulus noise and orientation) of one subject. Although all
models can roughly explain the trend in data (high correlation), the prediction of Prior Only
model is substantially off from the data. Flip Decision model tends to underestimate the
magnitude of subjects’ estimates. Overall, the performance of Flip Estimate, Flip Decision
and Resample models are roughly similar. All errobars indicate 95% confidence interval
computed over 200 bootstrapped samples.

3.3.2. Subjects maintain full sensory representation
To compare the model prediction and the data, I computed the mean estimates on CW and
CCW sides for each individual subject and each noise level. I also performed the model
fit to correct trials as in Experiment 1 and used the fit parameters to predict the mean
estimates in incorrect trials. The fit prior range indicates that all subjects learned the
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Figure 3.6: Dissociating the models by imposing an asymmetric prior. (a) Experiment
2 was similar to Experiment 1 except that the stimulus range was asymmetric around
the reference (CCW: 12 deg, CW: 30 deg) and subjects were explicitly reminded about
this by two gray arcs shown at the beginning of each trial. (b) Estimate pattern of one
representative subject. Estimation data and model fit are shown for correct trials with high
stimulus noise. The whole distribution pattern shifts upward to the CW side which suggests
that this subject learned the asymmetric stimulus range. (c) Given the learned asymmetric
prior, Flip Estimate model predicts a shift in the estimation pattern towards CCW side
whereas Flip Decision and Resample models predict an opposite shift towards CW side.
Data from this representative subject agree with Flip Decision and Resample models.
asymmetric stimulus range although some learned better than the others (Fig. 3.7a). All
except one subject (S7) show a consistent pattern that the mean estimates on CW side are
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higher than the mean estimates on CCW side (Fig. 3.7b). In contrast, the Flip Estimate
model predicts the opposite pattern for all subjects, that is, the mean estimates are lower
on CW compared to CCW side. The Flip Decision and Resample models, however, predict
similar pattern as the data.
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Figure 3.7: Model prediction and data in Experiment 2. (a) Fit parameters of individual
subjects. Fit sensory and memory noise are comparable to Experiment 1. Sensory noise
for the low noise condition is higher because the stimulus noise was increased for low noise
condition in Experiment 2. The fit prior range on CW side is higher than on CCW side
for all subjects. There is one additional free parameter in Experiment 2 which is subjects’
belief about the probability that the stimulus orientation is on CW side (this parameter was
fixed at 0.5 in Experiment 1). (b) Comparison of mean estimates between CW and CCW
sides for all subjects. Data show that mean estimates are larger on CW compared to CCW
side for all except one subject (S7). That pattern is in agreement with Flip Decision and
Resample models but is opposite to the Flip Estimate model. Subject S7 seems not able
to learn the asymmetric prior (the fit prior ranges are almost identical for CW and CCW
sides). Therefore, his data are not informative in distinguishing the models. All errobars
indicate 95% confidence interval computed over 200 bootstrapped samples.
I also computed the models’ performance using the metrics as in Experiment 1. The
likelihood metric indicates that for 4 out of 7 subjects, both Flip Decision and Resample
models outperform Flip Estimate model and for the other 3 subjects, only Resample model
outperforms Flip Estimate (Fig. 3.8a). The correlation and MSE metrics are also in agreeGo to Table of Contents
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ment with the likelihood metric (Fig. 3.8b). The correlation for Flip Estimate model (0.66)
is considerably lower than the correlation for Flip Decision and Resample models (both are
0.92). The MSE for Flip Estimate (7.9) is slightly higher than Flip Decision (7.5) and is
substantially higher than Resample model (2.5).
All of the above analyses consistently show that Flip Estimate model is inferior to
Flip Decision and Resample models. Because Flip Decision and Resample models rely on
the full sensory representation whereas Flip Estimate only relies on the modified sensory
representation, the results suggest that subjects preserve the full sensory representation
after the categorical decision. Another consistent finding from both Experiments 1 and 2
is that Resample model can best explain the data which suggests an interesting form of
self-consistency: subjects reconstruct the sensory evidence to make it consistent with the
new information (i.e. the feedback).

3.4. Discussion
Across two experiments, I tested how subjects maintain sensory representation in a sequence
of tasks by giving feedback in the first task. Comparisons of alternative models suggest
that subjects preserve the full sensory representation after the decision task and use that to
make the inference in the subsequent estimation task. Certainly, there are other strategies
subjects may use to make an estimation with the modified/intact sensory representation
and we cannot exhaustively test all of them. However there is a consistent trend across
the two experiments: the more an observer model uses sensory information, the better it
can predict the data. Specifically, the worst model is always Prior Only model which uses
no sensory information and the best model is always Resample model which relies heavily
on the full sensory representation. That points to the same direction of hypothesis 2 that
subjects maintain the full sensory representation.
The key difference between the experiments in the current study and previous studies
using the same sequential tasks (e.g. Experiment 1, chapter 2) is that subjects were given
feedback in the decision task and they knew about that beforehand. So some may argue
that subjects’ inference will be different compared to the scenario when no feedback is
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Figure 3.8: Performance of alternative models in Experiment 2. (a) Normalized log likelihood of the models. The log likelihood values are normalized such that the oracle model is
1 and the Flip Estimate model is 0. Note that we don’t consider the Prior Only model here
because it was ruled out in Experiment 1. Hence the lower bound is Flip Estimate instead
of Prior Only model. Out of 7 subjects, Resample model is the best for 6 subjects and Flip
Decision is the best for 1 subjects. In general, both the Flip Decision and Resample models
are better than the Flip Estimate model. (b) Scatter plot of model prediction vs. data.
The prediction of Flip Estimate model is worse than Flip Decision and Resample models in
terms of correlation and MSE with the data. The prediction of Flip Decision model shows
similar underestimation as in Experiment 1. The results are consistent with Experiment 1,
that is, Resample model can best explain the data in all metrics. All errobars indicate 95%
confidence interval computed over 200 bootstrapped samples.
given. Thus it may limit the generality of our findings. To solve that issue, we can have
an experimental design such that the feedback is only given in one catch trial. Obviously,
the limit of that design is there are too few useful trials. Nevertheless, given that the data
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patterns in correct trials are similar to the no-feedback scenario and the self-consistent
model can quantitatively account well for the data, it is likely that subjects’ inference is
very similar across the two situations.
It is interesting to see how the sensory representation is maintained in other sequential
task settings such as when subjects make a preliminary decision before making a final judgment (Bronfman et al., 2015) or when subjects perform a decision and report confidence
on that decision (Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010; Peters et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2015a). Although these studies found various kinds of sequential dependency between judgments, it
is not straightforward whether those effects can be readily explained by the self-consistent
Bayesian framework (see section 5.2 for a detailed discussion). Therefore, it is premature
to make specific speculation about the mechanism involving the sensory representation in
those scenarios.
The results in this chapter may have important implication in more practical situations
such as the reliability of eyewitness identification. Several lines of evidence have suggested
that human memory is highly malleable and vulnerable to distortion (Wixted et al., 2015;
Loftus, 2005) including the self-consistent behavior similar to the choice-induced biases
(Loftus, 1975). However, it is unclear whether the representation of original memory (the
analog of sensory representation) was modified or not (Loftus and Loftus, 1980). Note that
the literature on false memory is mostly about long-term memory whereas my study focuses
more on short-term memory. Therefore, there may be significant differences between the
two cases.

3.5. Methods
Experimental procedure
Eleven subjects with normal or corrected-to-normal vision (3 males, 8 females; one nonnaı̈ve) participated in the experiments. All of the subjects provided informed consent.
The experiments were approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of
Pennsylvania under protocol #819634.
General procedure: During the experiments, subjects sat in a darkened room and viewed
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the stimuli on a special purpose computer monitor (VIEWPixx3D, refresh rate of 120 Hz
and resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels) at a distance of 83.5 cm (Experiment 1) or 91 cm
(Experiment 2). We enforced the viewing distance with a chin rest. All experiments were
run in Matlab (Mathworks, Inc.) using the MGL toolbox (http://justingardner.net/mgl)
and Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard and Vision, 1997). We used an Apple Mac Pro
computer with Quad-Core Intel Xeon 2.93 GHz, 8GB RAM to run Matlab code. Subjects
were asked to fixate at the fixation dot whenever it appeared on the screen. Before the
main experiments, we trained each subject in 2-3 sessions to familiarize themselves with the
task and to have them learned an asymmetric stimulus range (Experiment 2). After that,
each subject either completed 2100 trials in 3-5 sessions for Experiment 1 or completed
1820 trials in 3-4 sessions for Experiment 2. Each session lasted approximately 50 minutes.
In total, there are 70 trials for each stimulus condition which includes 15 (Experiment 1)
or 13 (Experiment 2) stimulus orientations and two noise levels. Subjects used a gamepad
(Sony PS4 Dualshock) to give their answers. In the discrimination task, they indicated
their decision by pressing a trigger button (left for ’ccw’, right for ’cw’). In the estimation
task, they reported the perceived stimulus orientation by adjusting a reference line (length:
5 deg) with the analog joystick of the gamepad and then press a button to confirm. Screen
background luminance was 40 cd/m2 and mean stimulus luminance was 49 cd/m2 .
Experiment 1: Five subjects (S1-5) participated in Experiment 1. At the beginning
of each trial, subjects were presented with a fixation dot (diameter: 0.3o ) and a decision
boundary indicated by two black lines (length: 3o , distance from fixation: 3.5o ). We randomly sampled the orientation of the decision boundary from 0 to 180 (the full circle) in
each trial. After 1 s, we presented an orientation stimulus consisting of white line segments
(length: 0.6o ) that are arranged on two circular arrays centered at the fixation: the outer
circle (diameter: 3.8o ) has 16 line segments and the inner circle (diameter: 1.8o ) has 8
line segments. Small random jitters (from −0.15o to 0.15o ) were independently added to
the x-y coordinates of each line segment. We sampled the orientation of each line segment
from a Gaussian distribution whose mean (stimulus orientation) ranges from -21 (CCW)
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to 21 (CW) deg in steps of 3 and standard deviation (stimulus noise) are 3 and 18 deg.
The stimulus disappeared after 500 ms and subjects were instructed to indicate whether
the stimulus orientation was clockwise or counter-clockwise of the decision boundary. If
subjects’ response was within 4 seconds, a feedback tone (100 % valid) was briefly played
to specify whether subjects’ decision was correct (high-pitched) or incorrect (low-pitched).
Subjects then went on to report their perceived stimulus orientation. They were instructed
explicitly that the feedback was always valid and that they had to take into account the
feedback when performing the estimation task. If their response in the decision task was
more than 4 seconds, the current trial was skipped and was moved to the end of the trial
queue. At the end of each trial, a blank screen (mean luminance) was displayed with a
duration randomly chosen from 300 ms to 600 ms.
Experiment 2: Seven subjects (S1, S6-11) participated in Experiment 2. The procedure
in Experiment 2 was the same as in Experiment 1 except the following differences. The
stimulus range was from -12 to 0 in steps of 2 for the CCW side and from 5 to 30 in steps
of 5 for the CW side. We used different step sizes for the two sides to keep the number
of stimulus orientation on the CCW and CW sides the same while having a wider range
on the CW side. Because it is essential that subjects learned this asymmetric stimulus
range, we displayed the stimulus range at the beginning of each trial for both training and
main experiments. We also set the standard deviation of low-noise condition to 6 deg which
is higher than in Experiment 1 (3 deg) because it increases the discriminability between
models.
Training - simple motor task : In the first training, subjects were first presented with a
fixation dot. For those participating in Experiment 2, we also displayed a decision boundary (like in the main experiment) and a gray arc indicating the asymmetric stimulus range.
After the decision boundary and the gray arc (for Experiment 2 only) went away , a single
white line (like the reference line subjects used to do the estimation in main experiments)
was shown for 500 ms. Subjects then had to reproduce the presented white line by adjusting a reference line with the analog joystick. After they confirmed by pressing a button,
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the original stimulus was displayed again in green on top of subjects’ estimates. The decision boundary was uniformly sampled around the circle and the stimulus orientation was
uniformly sampled in the same range as in Experiment 1 and 2. Subjects completed 450
trials (Experiment 1) or 325 trials (Experiment 2). We computed the standard deviation
of subjects’ estimates and used that as a measure of individual motor noise in the model fit
and model prediction described below.
Training - estimation task : The estimation training is identical to the motor training
except that we used the array stimulus in the main experiment instead of the single line
stimulus. Subjects completed 100 trials (Experiment 1) or 150 trials (Experiment 2) for
this training.
Training - decision task : The stimulus was identical to estimation training but in this
training subjects performed a decision task (CCW/CW) and was given feedback like in the
main experiments. Subjects completed 900 trials (Experiment 1) or 200 trials (Experiment
2).

Self-consistent Bayesian observer model
The basic model was similar to formal description in chapter 2, Methods. The difference is
in the incorrect trials. For completeness, I describe the model for both correct and incorrect
trials.
Decision task
We assume the observer forms a hierarchical model about the task as illustrated in Fig. 3a.
Let C = {’cw’, ’ccw’} be the decision variable indicating whether the stimulus orientation
is cw or ccw relative to the decision boundary and θ be the stimulus orientation. In each
trial, the observer makes a sensory measurement m from the stimulus orientation θ. We
assume the observer knows the sensory uncertainty which is represented by the likelihood
function p(m|θ). The observer can then compute the likelihood over the decision variable
as follows:
Z

π

p(m|C) =

p(m|θ)p(θ|C)dθ .

(3.1)

−π

where p(θ|C) represents the observer’s prior expectation about the stimulus orientation on
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the two sides of the decision boundary. The observer then computes the posterior over the
decision variable by combining the likelihood and the prior p(C):

p(C|m) =

p(m|C)p(C)
p(m)

(3.2)

Given a symmetric loss function, the observer chooses the category with higher posterior
value (MAP estimate):

Ĉ(m) = argmaxC∈{’cw’,’ccw’} p(C|m) .

(3.3)

We can obtain the model prediction of the psychometric function by marginalizing over the
sensory measurement distribution:
Z
p(Ĉ|θ) =

p(Ĉ|m)p(m|θ)dm .

(3.4)

Estimation task
After the categorical decision, the observer performs inference for the estimation task. Because it took some time for the observer to finish the decision task, we assume that the
sensory measurement m is degraded in working memory and produces a memory sample
mm at the time the observer performs the estimation task. This process is formalized by
a draw from the distribution p(mm |m). The memory-corrupted sensory representation can
then be desribed with the likelihood:
Z
p(mm |θ) =

p(mm |m)p(m|θ)dm .

(3.5)

Importantly, the observer takes its categorical decision as a new piece of information. As
a result, the prior is updated using the preceding decision which results in a new conditioned
prior p(θ|Ĉ). Here there are 2 ways the observer may store the sensory representation in
working memory.
Hypothesis 1: the sensory representation is modified
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Because the observer trusts its decision as a fact, it may directly modify the sensory
representation by combining the likelihood and the conditioned prior:

pnew (mm |θ) = p(mm |θ)p(θ|Ĉ)

(3.6)

Effectively, the observer erases the part of sensory representation that is inconsistent with
the decision. If the feeback then indicates that the observer’s decision was correct, it then
computes the posterior from this modified sensory representation:

p(θ|mm , Ĉ) ∝ pnew (mm |θ)

(3.7)

Assuming L-2 loss function, the estimate is the mean of the posterior:
Z

π

θ̂(mm , Ĉ) =

θp(θ|mm , Ĉ)dθ .

(3.8)

−π

However, if the feedback indicates that the decision was incorrect, the observer cannot
perform the computation as above because the sensory representation on the correct side
(i.e. the part that is inconsistent with the decision) was erased. We consider two strategies
the observer may use to do the estimation.
1a-Prior only: The observer totally disregards the sensory representation and performs
inferference only on the prior. More specifcally, it uses the feedback to update the conditioned prior to obtain p(θ|¬Ĉ). Because the observer considers the sensory information as
uninformative, the posterior is the same as the prior. Using L-2 loss function as before, the
estimate is the mean of the new prior.
1a-Flip Decision: The observer pretends that the decision was correct and performs the
inference as in the correct trial to obtain the point estimate θ̂(mm , Ĉ). Then because this
estimate is on the incorrect side according to the feedback, the observer flips this estimate
to the other side which is equivalent to taking −θ̂(mm , Ĉ) as the final estimate.
Hypothesis 2: the sensory representation is preserved
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The observer preserves the full sensory representation in working memory. In the correct
trials, the observer computes the posterior from the likelihood and the conditioned prior:

p(θ|mm , Ĉ) =

p(mm |θ)p(θ|Ĉ)
p(m|Ĉ)

(3.9)

The estimate is then the mean of the posterior under L-2 loss function as in hypothesis 1.
Computationally, the estimates for correct trials are the same for both hypotheses. The
difference only arises in the incorrect trials. Here we consider two strategies to make an
estimation in incorrect trials for hypothesis 2.
2a - Flip Decision: Because the categorical decision is incorrect, the observer flips the
decision bit and uses that to update the conditioned prior p(θ|¬Ĉ). Then it combines this
updated prior with the likelihood to make an estimation as in the correct trials.
2b - Resample: The observer also updates the conditioned prior based on feedback as
in Flip Decision model. However, because the feedback implies that the original sensory
measurement was incorrect, the observer tries to reconstruct a new sensory sample that
is consistent with the feedback. In particular, the observer keeps resampling from the
distribution p(mr |m) until it gets a sample that is on the correct side. Then the likelihood
constructed around this new sample p(mr |θ) is combined with the conditioned prior to make
the inference as in the correct trials.
To obtain the predictive distribution, we marginalize over the distribution of memory
sample (or the resampled sample for Resample model):
Z
p(θ̂|θ, Ĉ) =

p(θ̂|mm , Ĉ)p(mm |θ)dmm .

(3.10)

and then marginalize over the distribution of decision outcome (the psychometric function):
p(θ̂|θ) =

X

p(θ̂|θ, Ĉ)p(Ĉ|θ) .

(3.11)

Ĉ

To account for subjects’ motor noise, we convolve this predictive distribution with a
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noise kernel that is specified from the motor noise training experiment.
Model specification
The parametric features of the model components are described below:
• The category prior p(C) is set to 0.5 for Experiment 1 because both categories are
equally likely. However, we leave this as a free parameter for Experiment 2 because
the asymmetric stimulus range may induce a non-uniform category prior.
• The prior distribution over stimulus orientation p(θ|C) are either symmetric (Experiment 1) or asymmetric (Experiment 2) around the decision boundary. More specifically, p(θ|C) is constant from the decision boundary up to a certain range on each
side and then monotonically decreases to zero with a cosine roll-off. So the prior distribution is characterized by two parameters: the prior range α which is the distance
from the decision boundary to half the magnitude of the uniform range and a smooth
factor β which indicates how smooth the roll-off is.
• The measurement distribution p(m|θ) is a Gaussian that is centered on the stimulus orientation θ and has the standard deviation σs proportional to the sensory
uncertainty. We assume the sensory uncertainty of each subject only depends on the
stimulus noise and is the same across other experimental conditions.
• We assume the original sensory measurement m is corrupted by memory noise and
becomes mm . This is modeled by drawing from a Gaussian p(mm |m) centered on the
original sensory measurement m. The width of this distribution σm is assumed to
be different across subjects but is the same for each subject across all experimental
conditions.
• For the Resample model, the resampling distribution p(mr |mm ) is centered on the
p
2 .
memory sample mm and has the width σs2 + σm
• The motor noise is modeled as a Gaussian with standard deviation σ0 that is extracted
for each individual subject from the motor noise training experiment.
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Model fit
We performed a joint fit to all trials of the decision task and correct trials of the
estimation task by maximizing the likelihood of model given the data:

p(D|ρ) =

n
Y

P (Di |ρ) =

i=1

n
Y

P (Ĉi |ρ)p(θ̂i |ρ)

(3.12)

i=1

where D is the data, ρ is the parameters of the model, Ĉi is subjects’ decision, θ̂i is
subjects’ orientation estimate, i is the trial index and n is the number of trials.
We used Nelder-Mead simplex optimization algorithm to minimize the negative log likelihood −log(p(D|ρ)). We ran the optimization routine thirty times starting at randomized
initial parameter values to find the best parameter set.
The fit parameters were then used to make prediction in the incorrect trials by implementing different strategies (see above).
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Chapter 4
Self-consistency in number judgment

4.1. Introduction
Previous chapters and other studies (Jazayeri and Movshon, 2007; Zamboni et al., 2016)
have shown the post-decision biases in sequential judgments for several low-level visual
stimuli such as motion direction and orientation. The biases were well explained by the
self-consistent Bayesian model across several experimental settings. Because the bias effect
bears a close resemblance to cognitive biases in value-based decision-making (see section
1.2), self-consistent inference is likely to hold for other high-level stimuli as well. In this
chapter, I examine whether the bias effect also occurs for a high-level cognitive variable in
a similar decision situation.
Human perception of numbers has been shown to be a high-level variable that is independent of many associated low-level features (Anobile et al., 2016; Cicchini et al., 2016;
Harvey et al., 2013). Several perceptual effects found in low-level variables also hold for
number perception (e.g. adaptation - Burr and Ross (2008), Arrighi et al. (2014) and saccadic compression - Burr et al. (2010)). Furthermore, it has been shown that subjects’
sensitivity to number stimulus was reduced after making an intermediate categorical decision (Bronfman et al., 2015). Hence it is interesting to see whether the post-decision bias
found in previous chapters also hold for number perception.
Across three experiments using both non-symbolic (dot array) and symbolic (Arabic
numeral) forms of number, I found a robust bimodal pattern in subjects’ estimates which
is similar to that shown in the low-level stimuli. Moreover, the self-consistent Bayesian
model can provide a good quantitative fit and prediction of the data. The findings suggest
self-consistent behavior is quite general across several types of stimuli.
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4.2. Dot array stimulus
4.2.1. Choice-induced bias in perceived number of dots
The first aim is to replicate the sequential bias effect in previous chapters using a nonsymbolic form of number stimuli. In Experiment 1, subjects made a sequence of judgments
on a dot stimulus (Fig. 4.1). The stimulus consists of an array of dots and was presented
for 20 ms or 1000 ms. Several low-level features of the dots (size, location, etc.) were
randomized across trials to minimize their effects on number perception (see Methods Experiment 1 for a detailed description). After the stimulus disappeared, subjects first
reported whether the number of dots was less or greater than 40. Subsequently, they
estimated the exact number of dots by adjusting a probe line.

Experiment 1
20 ms
or 1000 ms

Discrimination

(less or greater than 40)
70

Estimation
Time

Figure 4.1: Experiment 1 procedure. After fixation, subjects were presented with an array
of dots. The number of dots was randomly chosen in the range 33 to 47. Presentation
time was varied across trials to modulate the task difficulty. Subjects first had to indicate
whether the number of dots was less or greater than 40. Then they adjusted a probe line
to report the number of dots.
As expected, in decision task subjects performed better when the stimulus duration
is longer. Standard deviations of the fit cumulative Gaussian are 3.17 and 4.65 deg for
1000 ms and 20 ms conditions, respectively. There is also a noticeable leftward shift of the
psychometric functions (point of subjective equality (PSE): 38.8), suggesting that subjects’
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decisions were biased towards greater values (Fig. 4.2a). In the estimation task, subjects
exhibited characteristic biases away from the reference at 40 which resembles the bimodal
bias patterns using orientation and motion direction stimuli (see e.g. Fig. 2.1). The results
suggest that number perception is also subject to similar bias effect as other low-level
variables in a sequential task setting.

4.2.2. Explaining the bias with self-consistent model
Given that the dot stimulus results in similar bimodal bias pattern as low-level variables
considered before in Chapter 2 and 3, I also expect the self-consistent model to qualitatively
capture this pattern. To test whether the model can also quantitatively account for subjects’
behavior, I jointly fit the same self-consistent model used in Chapter 2 to both decision and
estimation data (see Methods for detailed description of the model). Model fits shows that
the basic model can explain the general pattern in the data, yet it fails to capture some
nuanced features (Fig. 4.2b). First, it cannot capture the bias in the psychometric function
which is expected because I assume a uniform prior over the decision variable, hence forcing
the PSE to be at 40. Second, the distribution of estimates predicted by the model is more
biased towards the center of the stimulus range than the data. As a consequence, the tail
of the distribution is more biased away from the decision boundary than actually found in
subjects’ estimate. Moreover, subjects’ estimates are also generally biased towards higher
values which is not captured by the model (Fig. 4.7 in the supplementary material). To
test whether the model can be modified to account for those deviations, I consider three
variants of the basic model that target three main assumptions: a Gaussian measurement
distribution in the linear space, a squared loss function and a uniform prior over decision
variable.
Several neuroimaging studies have suggested that the neuronal encoding of number tend
to follow a Gaussian shape in the log space (Nieder and Miller, 2003; Nieder and Merten,
2007; Piazza et al., 2004). That is consistent with psychophysics studies showing that
human perception of number obeys Weber’s law within a certain range (Anobile et al., 2016,
2015). To test how logarithmic encoding of number would change the model prediction,
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Figure 4.2: Data and model fit in Experiment 1. (a) Subjects’ data in decision and estimation tasks (combined subject). Psychometric functions indicate that sensory noise is quite
similar across the two presentation times. Also, the psychometric functions are shifted to
the left, suggesting that subjects’ decisions are biased towards ‘greater than 40’. Distribution of subjects’ estimates shows the characteristic bimodal pattern. The bias magnitudes
in subjects’ estimates are quite similar for the two presentation times. (b) Model fits of
different versions of self-consistent model. Basic model uses a Gaussian likelihood in linear
space, a squared loss function and a uniform prior over the decision. The other variants
change one of those properties. Model with log encoding uses Gaussian likelihood in log
space. Model with fit loss function leaves the power of loss function as a free parameter in
the fitting. Model with fit prior leaves the prior over decision variable as a free parameter.
Although all models can qualitatively account for the bimodal distribution of subjects’ estimate, the model with fit loss function provides the best quantitative fit (see Fig. 4.7 for
clearer comparison). On the other hand, the model with fit prior best captures the subjects’
bias towards ”greater than 40” in decision task.
I incorporated it into the basic model by assuming that the measurement distribution is
Gaussian in logarithmic space. It effectively results in measurement distributions skewing
towards higher values and distribution variance increasing with the stimulus number (Nieder
and Miller, 2003). As a consequence, there is an inherent bias towards higher values.
Although model fit to subjects’ data reflects this bias in the leftward shift of psychometric
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function, the bias magnitude is too small to account for the actual bias in the data (Fig.
4.2b). Furthermore, the model still cannot account for the smaller bias in the tail of the
estimate distribution. In general, the model fit using logarithmic encoding is very similar
to the basic model.
One important component of a Bayesian observer model is the loss function which
represents how decision error is penalized. When the stimulus variable is continuous with a
well-defined metric space, it is reasonable to assume that large error is penalized more than
small error. This is often parameterized by a loss function of power form L(θ̂, θ) = |θ̂ − θ|n
in which θ is the stimulus variable, θ̂ is the observer’s estimate and n indicates how much
to penalize larger error. In the basic model, I assume a squared loss function (n = 2) which
is a common choice in perception. To test how the model may change when I relax that
assumption, I let the power n of the loss function as a free parameter in the model fit.
With the fit power close to 0 (n = 0.0003), the model can account pretty well for subjects’
estimate distribution, especially at the long tail (Fig. 4.2b). It suggests that subjects
prioritized getting the exactly correct answer rather than trying to get as close as possible
to the correct answer. That may be because in the current experimental task, the stimulus
variable comes in discrete form (integer numbers) thus implicitly encouraging subjects to
employ the winner-takes-all loss function.
Although the previous modifications to the model could address the estimate distribution, they still fail to account for the bias in subjects’ decision towards greater values. A
straightforward fix is to change the model’s prior over the decision variable. As expected,
fitting the decision prior (p(”greater”) = 0.57) helps the model to capture the decision bias
by shifting the psychometric function to the left. Interestingly, it can also capture a general
small shift in the estimate distribution towards greater values.
In general, the modeling suggests that with appropriate modifications, the self-consistent
model can quantitatively account for the subjects’ behavior in both decision and estimation
tasks.
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4.3. Symbolic number stimulus
4.3.1. Probabilistic inference over a sequence of numbers
The post-decision bias found in the previous section using dot stimulus provides supporting
evidence for the generality of the sequential effect in high-level stimulus. However, several
researchers have been arguing that the sense of number using dot stimulus is still affected
by low-level features such as dot density, size, etc. (Gebuis and Reynvoet, 2012; Hurewitz
et al., 2006). Therefore, the bias in the perceived number of dots may be confounded by
low-level features. To address this issue, I conducted two more experiments using symbolic
numbers and designed the task as a form of statistical inference.
In Experiment 2, the stimulus was a sequence of eight Arabic numerals drawn from a
truncated discrete Gaussian distribution centered on the stimulus number (Fig. 4.3a, see
Methods- Experiment 2 for details). After the stimulus presentation, subjects first decided
whether the stimulus number was less or greater than 40 and then provided an estimate of
the stimulus number. Because the numerals were presented clearly on the screen, most of the
stimulus uncertainty comes from the sampling distribution of the presented numbers. That
is in contrast to the dot cloud stimulus whose uncertainty comes mostly from sensory noise.
Therefore I have better control over subjects’ perceptual uncertainty and can obtain two
markedly different uncertainty levels as observed in subjects’ decisions (see psychometric
functions in Fig. 4.3b). That is also reflected in subjects’ estimates: the bias and variance
are exceedingly larger for high uncertainty condition (Fig. 4.3b and Fig. 4.3c). The
distribution of subjects’ estimates reveals a similar bias pattern as in the dot stimulus (Fig.
4.3c). The results suggest that post-decision bias in sequential tasks holds for the number
variable, regardless of whether it is symbolic or non-symbolic forms.

4.3.2. Trial-by-trial prediction of observer models
Because the sequence of numerals was shown clearly at a moderate rate, it is reasonable
to assume that subjects registered those samples quite accurately and used those samples
to make judgments on the stimulus number. Given that assumption, ideal observer models
can make predictions on subjects’ decision and estimate in each trial (Fig. 4.4a). Note that
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Figure 4.3: Experiment 2 procedure and result. (a) Stimulus is a sequence of 8 Arabic
numerals drawn from a discrete truncated Gaussian centered on a stimulus number. The
width of the Gaussian was modulated to obtain different stimulus uncertainty (standard
deviation was 2 or 10). The stimulus number was chosen randomly in each trial within the
range 32 to 48. Subjects first indicated whether the stimulus number was less or greater
than 40. Then they had to report the stimulus number. (b) Data (combined subject) for
decision and estimation tasks. When the stimulus uncertainty increases, the psychometric
function is shallower and the estimation bias is larger. Note that the estimate bias is shown
for correct trials only. (c) The full distribution of subjects’ estimates across two levels of
stimulus uncertainty. Contrary to Experiment 1, because subjects’ sensory noise is markedly
different for two stimulus uncertainties as shown in (b), there is significant differences in
estimate distributions across the uncertainty levels. More specifically, the characteristic
bimodal pattern is clearly observed in the high uncertainty condition whereas the biases are
small for the low uncertainty condition.
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for the dot stimulus, most of the uncertainty is from the internal sensory noise. As a result,
I don’t have access to the sensory samples subjects used to make judgments in each trial,
hence the observer models can only predict the overall distribution of decision and estimate.
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Figure 4.4: Comparing alternative models. (a) Trial-by-trial prediction. In each trial, an
observer model uses the presented number sequence to make judgments. For example,
probabilistic models construct the overall likelihood from the sample numbers and combine
it with the prior to make specific predictions in each trial for both decision and estimation
tasks. (b) Example data (black circles) from a representative subject (S1) is shown for
the condition when the stimulus number is 42 and the stimulus uncertainty is high. The
Sample Average model simply takes the mean of presented numbers. The standard Bayesian
model makes inference from the prior and likelihood determined by the experimental design.
The self-consistent Bayesian model is similar to the standard Bayesian model except that
the prior is conditioned on subjects’ decision in each trial. Although all models can track
subject’s estimates relatively well, the self-consistent model is better in some cases (esp.
when subjects’ decision is different from model prediction as in trial 3). (c) Mean-squared
error between model prediction and subject’s estimates were computed for each individual
subject. The results are quite consistent across all subjects: The self-consistent model
performs significantly better than other models and the Sample Average model is the worst.
Error bars indicate ±1 SEM computed over all trials.
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Here I consider three alternative models. The Sample Average model assumes that
the observer disregards information about stimulus uncertainty and makes judgments using
the average of presented numbers. Both standard Bayesian and self-consistent Bayesian
model construct the overall likelihood from the sample likelihoods and combine that with
the prior to make both decision and estimates. The difference between these two models is
the prior. The standard Bayesian model uses the experimental prior which is uniform over
the stimulus range. On the other hand, the self-consistent model uses a conditional prior
that depends on the subjects’ decision in each trial. For example, if subjects’ decision is
”greater than 40”, the conditional prior is uniform over the range [40, 48]. In other words,
the self-consistent Bayesian model uses subjects’ own decision to predict the estimate on a
trial-by-trial basis. The likelihood of two Bayesian models is determined by the stimulus
generation process. Consequently, there is no free parameter in the models. Moreover,
the prediction of Sample Average model is the same for all subjects. That is also true for
the standard Bayesian model but not for the self-consistent Bayesian model because the
latter uses subjects’ decision to make prediction on the estimate. In general, all models can
predict subjects’ decisions and estimate relatively well (see Fig. 4.4b for an example). To
quantify the predictive power of the models, I computed the mean squared error between
model prediction and data across all trials for each subject. The results show a consistent
trend across all subjects: self-consistent Bayesian model are better than other models by a
significant amount (Fig. 4.4c). Because the key difference between self-consistent model and
other models (especially the standard Bayesian model) is its reliance on subjects’ decision,
the error analysis suggests that subjects’ decision play an important role in the estimation
process.

4.3.3. Replicating the result with different task instruction
Although the results using symbolic number stimulus provide further support for postdecision bias in number perception, there are two limitations in the experimental design.
First, by asking whether the stimulus number was less or greater than 40, subjects may
develop a tendency to avoid number 40 in their response, thus artificially resulting in the
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bimodal pattern in estimate distribution. Second, the training doesn’t explicitly instruct
subjects on how the stimulus was generated. Subjects were supposed to learn about the
stimulus by practicing the tasks with feedback in each trial. Therefore, I conducted Experiment 3 to eliminate those limitations.

a

b

Decision task

Low group

High group
31 42 39 38 34 41 40 41

Easy condi�on

Is the urn in low group or high group?
Intui�ve, fast judgment (within 2 seconds).

Es�ma�on task
Diﬃcult condi�on

31 42 39 38 34 41 40 41
Which urn have I picked to draw the samples from?

Figure 4.5: Instruction for Experiment 3. (a) Stimulus generation process. Eighteen urns
contain a large number of balls. The urns are arranged into low (31-39) and high (40-48)
groups. The distribution of balls in each urn is centered on the urn label (40 in the illustrative example). The distribution width is determined by the uncertainty condition: narrow
for the easy and wide for the difficult condition. (b) Experimental tasks. In each trial, an
urn is randomly chosen. Then a sequence of eight balls is drawn from this urn. Subjects
had to first decide whether the chosen urn was from low or high group. Subsequently, they
had to report the urn label. To prevent subjects from implicitly making the estimate first,
it was emphasized that the decision task has to be performed quickly. Note that this is for
the training only and the procedure in the main experiment is the same as in Experiment
2 (see Fig. 4.3a)
The design of Experiment 3 was similar to Experiment 2 except for the following differences. First, I split the stimulus numbers into two groups: low group (31-39) and high
group (40-48) so that the decision task is whether the stimulus is in low group or high
group. That eliminates concern about subjects avoiding the decision boundary at the middle of the stimulus range. Second, I gave subjects an intuitive description of the stimulus
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generation and the experimental task in form of an urn example (Fig. 4.5). The instruction
emphasizes that the experimental tasks are probabilistic inference over the hidden variable
(stimulus number) from a set of observed samples (Arabic numerals). There were two other
minor changes in Experiment 3. The stimulus uncertainty was slightly higher in the easy
condition and I had separate blocks of easy and difficult trials which were explicitly labeled
for subjects. The latter was meant to improve the accuracy of subjects’ statistical inference,
hence facilitates the comparison between probabilistic observer models (the standard and
the self-consistent Bayesian models).
Experimental results confirm what I have found in Experiment 2 with a clear bimodal
bias pattern in the distribution of subjects’ estimates (Fig. 4.6b). Subjects’ judgments in
both decision and estimation tasks are also noisier in the easy condition than in Experiment
2, reflecting the increase in stimulus noise in that condition (Fig. 4.6a, b). Prediction errors
of alternative models vary widely across subjects, yet follows the same consistent pattern
in Experiment 2: the self-consistent model is always the best, followed by the standard
Bayesian model. The errors between model prediction and data are also higher compared
to Experiment 2. That may be due to the increased stimulus uncertainty and wider stimulus
range. Together with the results of previous experiments, the findings suggest subjects did
perform probabilistic inference instead of a heuristic strategy (Sample Average) and subjects
decision affects the subsequent estimation process.

4.4. Discussion
I have shown that the perceived number of dots was systematically biased away from the
decision boundary after having made a categorical decision on the same stimulus variable
(Experiment 1). The bias pattern is similar to that found in several low-level stimulus variables. Further experimental tests and model analysis using a sequence of Arabic numerals
show similar results in the bias pattern of subjects’ estimate (Experiment 2 and 3). The
findings suggest that post-decision bias in sequential decision tasks holds for a high-level
stimulus. Therefore, self-consistent inference may be a general strategy humans use in many
sequential task scenarios.
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Figure 4.6: Experiment 3 result. (a) The results in both decision and estimation tasks are
similar to Experiment 2. The psychometric curve in low uncertainty condition is shallower
compared to Experiment 2 because a slightly higher uncertainty level was used. (b) The
bimodal bias pattern in subjects’ estimates are also similar to that in Experiment 2. (c)
The prediction errors of alternative models are consistent across all subjects. The selfconsistent model is always the best, followed by the standard Bayesian model. Generally,
the errors are slightly higher than in Experiment 2.
Model fit to subjects’ judgments in dot stimulus experiment suggests that subjects
employ a loss function close to L0 loss (MAP estimator). The similar distribution of subjects’ estimate in symbolic number experiments gives further support for that finding. Most
studies applying Bayesian model to perception explain experimental data by addressing the
prior distribution (Knill and Richards, 1996; Weiss et al., 2002; Girshick et al., 2011; Seriès
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and Seitz, 2013) and/or the likelihood function (Wei and Stocker, 2015; Ernst and Banks,
2002; Alais and Burr, 2004; Ernst et al., 2000; Sato and Kording, 2014). The loss function is
somewhat neglected in perception studies (but see e.g. Whiteley and Sahani (2008); Landy
et al. (2007)). The reason may be partly because the loss function mainly characterizes
how an action is rewarded/penalized while perception research is more concerned about
subjective experience about the world, not the action that follows a perceptual judgment or
the reward that follows the action. Nevertheless, even without a clear reward contingency,
the task structure may predispose subjects towards a certain loss function. For example, in
the sequential-task experiment with low-level stimuli (e.g. orientation stimulus in chapter
1), subjects provided the estimate on a continuous scale. On the other hand, the number
experiments in this chapter required subjects to report their estimate on a discrete scale of
integer numbers. As a result, subjects in number experiments may be more inclined towards
L0 loss whereas subjects in orientation experiment are closer to using L2 loss despite the
fact that both stimulus variables are continuous and subjects were instructed to get as close
as possible to the correct answer.
In symbolic number experiments (Experiment 2 and 3), all observer models assume
that subjects have perfect memory of the presented samples and complete knowledge of the
stimulus statistics. In practice, those strong assumptions are rarely satisfied by an average
human subject. For example, several studies have shown that human subjects tend to
give different weighs to sequentially presented stimuli in their judgments. Specifically the
weights are higher for early samples (primacy effect) and/or late samples (recency effect)
for a wide range of stimuli including words (see Davelaar et al. (2005) for a review), lowlevel perceptual stimuli (Cheadle et al., 2014; Tsetsos et al., 2012; Drugowitsch et al., 2016;
Kiani et al., 2008) and symbolic number (Brezis et al., 2015). In our experiments, there
is a slight recency effect in Experiment 3 but no clear pattern was found in Experiment 3
( Fig. 4.8 in the supplementary material). Another possible imperfection is that subjects
do not use the exact sampling distribution of the stimulus to make inference. Instead, they
may resort to some heuristic to estimate the variance of that distribution (e.g. taking the
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variance from the presented samples). Incorporating those constraints into the observer
models may improve their prediction. However, it is unlikely that doing so will change the
general pattern in the model prediction errors.
Human judgments have been shown to be irrational in a vast amount of high-level cognitive experiments that explicitly stated the probabilistic structure of the task in numerical
terms (e.g. choosing between gambles) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1981; Kahneman,
2011). In contrast, human behaviors are close to optimal inference in a wide range of
low-level perceptual and motor tasks. Several researchers have attempted to explain the
discrepancy between low-level and high-level experiments (e.g. two decision-making system
- Kahneman (2003), Oaksford and Hall (2016) or experience-description gap - Hertwig and
Erev (2009), Rakow and Newell (2010)). However, the experimental results in this chapter suggest that in sequential decision settings, the behavioral pattern of human subjects
are quite similar regardless of whether the stimulus is low-level (e.g. orientation) or highlevel (e.g. a sequence of Arabic numerals). It is actually consistent with more recent studies
showing that when the experiments using low-level and high-level stimuli are well controlled
and well matched, there is no significant difference in human judgments (Jarvstad et al.,
2013, 2012). Therefore, the distinction between cognitive and perceptuo-motor judgments
may be more apparent than real.

4.5. Method and supplementary material
Experimental procedure
Fourteen subjects with normal or corrected-to-normal vision (one non-naı̈ve) participated in
the experiments. All of the subjects provided informed consent. The experiments were approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Pennsylvania under protocol
#819634.
General procedure
During the experiments, subjects sat in a darkened room and viewed the stimuli on a
special purpose computer monitor (VIEWPixx3D, refresh rate of 120 Hz and resolution
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of 1920 x 1080 pixels) at a distance of 87 cm. I enforced the viewing distance with a
chin rest. All experiments were run in Matlab (Mathworks, Inc.) using the MGL toolbox
(http://justingardner.net/mgl) and Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard and Vision, 1997). I
used an Apple Mac Pro computer with Quad-Core Intel Xeon 2.93 GHz, 8GB RAM to
run Matlab code. Subjects were asked to fixate at the fixation dot whenever it appeared
on the screen. Before the main experiments, subjects had training sessions to familiarize
themselves with the experimental tasks so that they could perform the task properly. The
training spanned 2-3 sessions (Experiment 1 and 2) or 1 session (Experiment 3). After
that, subjects performed the main experiment spreading over several days (1200 trials in
2-3 session for Experiment 1; 1394 trials in 3-5 sessions for Experiment 2; 1476 trials in
4-6 sessions for Experiment 3). Each session lasted approximately 50 minutes. In each
experimental condition, there are 40 trials (Experiment 1) or 41 trials (Experiment 2 and
3). Screen background luminance was 40 cd/m2 and mean stimulus luminance was 49
cd/m2 .
Experiment 1
Main experiment: Four subjects (S1-4) participated in Experiment 1. At the beginning of
each trial, subjects were presented with a fixation dot (diameter: 0.3o ). After 1 s, an array
of dots were presented for either 20 ms or 1000 ms. In each trial, I randomly sampled the
number of dots from a uniform distribution over the range 33 to 47. The dots’ locations
were randomly chosen inside a circular aperture of 7 degrees in diameter. The diameter
of each dot also randomly varied from 0.07 to 0.35 degrees. The dots’ location and size
were generated using Matlab code provided in Gebuis and Reynvoet (2011). After the dots
disappeared, subjects used a gamepad (Sony PS4 Dualshock) to perform 2 tasks. First,
they had to indicate whether the number of dots was less or greater than 40 by pressing a
trigger button (left for ’less’, right for ’greater’). Then they had to estimate the number of
dots by adjusting an analog stick on the gamepad and pressing a confirm button. If their
response in the first task was more than 4 seconds, that trial was skipped and added to
the end of the trial queue. At the end of each trial, a blank screen (mean luminance) was
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displayed with a duration randomly chosen from 300 ms to 600 ms.
Training-Discrimination: The experimental procedure was similar to the main experiment except that (i) subjects only performed the discrimination task (less or greater than
40) and (ii) they were given auditory feedback (100% valid) in every trial (high-pitched
beep: correct, low-pitched beep: incorrect). Subjects performed 1200 trials in this training.
Training-Estimation: The experimental procedure was similar to the main experiment
except that (i) subjects only performed the estimation task and (ii) the correct number of
dots were displayed in green color after their response. Subjects performed 600 trials in this
training.
Experiment 2
Main experiment: Six subjects participated in Experiment 2 (S1, S5-S9). After a black
fixation dot was displayed for 1 s, a sequence of 8 Arabic numerals was presented one at a
time at the center of the screen. Each numeral was presented for 250 ms with a blank screen
of 50 ms between consecutive numbers. The numbers were generated as follows. In each
trial, a true number was drawn randomly from 32 to 48. Then a sample of 8 numbers was
drawn from a truncated discretized normal distribution centered on the true number. To
create that modified normal distribution, I first truncated a continuous normal distribution
by discarding the tails on the two sides that are more than 2 standard deviations from the
mean. Then I discretized the distribution at the integer values and normalized to make it a
proper probability distribution. To modulate the stimulus noise, I chose two values for the
standard deviations: 2 for low and 10 for high noise. After the last number was presented, a
black fixation dot was displayed and subjects had to indicate whether the true number was
less or greater than 40 by pressing a key on a computer keyboard (’s’: less, ’f’: greater).
Then subjects reported the true number by adjusting a knob (Griffin PowerMate, wired
version) and pressing a key on the keyboard (’Enter’) to confirm. Similar to Experiment
1, there was a time-out for the first task so that the trial was skipped if subjects failed to
respond within 4 seconds. An inter-trial interval was chosen randomly in the range 500-800
ms.
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Training-Discrimination: The experimental procedure was similar to the main experiment except that (i) subjects only performed the discrimination task (less or greater than
40) and (ii) they were given auditory feedback (100% valid) in every trial (high-pitched
beep: correct, low-pitched beep: incorrect). Subjects performed 272 trials in this training.
Training-Estimation: The experimental procedure was similar to the main experiment
except that (i) subjects only performed the estimation task and (ii) after their response,
the true number was shown in green color above subjects’ estimate. Subjects performed
272 trials in this training.
Experiment 3
Seven subjects participated in Experiment 3 (S1, S10-S15). The procedure was similar to
Experiment 2 except the differences listed below.
Main experiment: The true number in each trial was randomly drawn over the range
31-48. Two standard deviations were used for the sampling distribution: 4 and 10. In
Experiment 2, the two stimulus noise conditions are randomly interleaved across all trials.
In contrast, Experiment 3 was split into blocks of 10 trials with each block only containing
one noise condition. Subjects were explicitly informed about the noise level at the beginning
of each block (e.g. ”This is an easy block”). In the decision task, subjects indicated whether
the true number was in the low group (31-39) or in the high group (40-48). The time-out
for the decision task is 2 seconds instead of 4 seconds.
Training: Subjects were given a more detailed and intuitive description of how the
stimulus was generated. More specifically, the task was framed in the context of an urn
example. Fig.4.5 illustrates this with figures taken from the instruction slides. There are
18 urns each of them is labeled from 31 to 48. The urns are split into 2 groups: low group
(urns 31-39) and high group (urns 40-48). In each urn, there is a large number of balls and
each ball is marked with a number. The content of each urn is determined by its label.
For instance, if the urn’s label is 40, the distribution of balls is centered on 40 and the
width is proportional to the task difficulty (see Fig.4.5a). Given this setup, subjects’ task
is as follows (see Fig.4.5b). In each trial, an urn is randomly chosen but subjects do not
Go to Table of Contents

95

know which urn it is. Then the experimenter sequentially draws 8 balls from the urn and
shows them to subjects. First, subjects have to guess whether the chosen urn is in the low
group or high group. The experimenter stresses that this decision has to be made quickly
(within 1.5 seconds). After that, subjects have to guess what urn was actually chosen. The
training was split into 3 parts: estimation task, decision task and both tasks. After the
instruction with slides, subjects performed 10-20 trials to familiarize themselves with the
task and raised any questions they had about the task. All the training was done in one
session.

Modeling
Dot stimulus
The basic model is the same as the self-consistent Bayesian observer used in Experiment 1,
chapter 2 (see Appendix B). Other variants of the basic models are described below:
Logarithmic encoding: The measurement distribution and the memory recall distribution are Gaussian on the logarithm space:

p(m|θ) =

p(mm |m) =

−(log(m)−log(θ)2
2
2σs

1
√

e

1
√

e

σs 2π

σm 2π

−(log(mm )−log(m)2
2
2σm

(4.1)

(4.2)

Fit loss function: In this model, I use the loss function of the form L(θ̂, θ) = |θ̂ − θ|n
and fit the power n jointly with other parameters.
Fit decision prior : In this model, the observer’s prior over decision variable P (0 cw0 ) is
fit jointly with other parameters.
Symbolic number stimulus
Sample Average model : The model takes the average µ̂ of the presented samples and reports
0 greater 0

if µ̂ is greater than 40. For the estimation, it simply rounds µ̂ to the nearest integer.

Standard Bayesian model and self-consistent Bayesian model : The models are similar
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to the independent Bayesian observer and self-consistent Bayesian observer in Chapter 2
(see Methods) except that (i) all probability distribution is discrete, (ii) the prior is the
experimental prior of the stimulus, (iii) the measurement distribution was the truncated
discrete Gaussian described in the method above, and (iv) the self-consistent Bayesian
model conditions the prior on subjects’ decision in each trial.
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Figure supplement
Basic model
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Figure 4.7: Histogram of subjects’ estimates and model fits in Experiment 1. The green
bars indicate the distribution of subjects estimates (combined subject, n=4) and the black
curves indicate model fit. Each row corresponds to a stimulus noise level (upper: lower
noise). Each column corresponds to the presented number of dots. Although the basic
model can capture the general bimodal pattern in subjects’ estimates, it fails to match the
height and position of the distribution peak in some conditions (e.g. when the number of
dots is 38). Overall, the peaks of subjects’ estimate distributions are closer to the decision
boundary than the model fit. The log encoding model is largely similar to the basic model
with a small bias towards greater values (when the stimulus number is 40, the right peak
is slightly higher than the left peak). The fit loss function model can capture the peaks in
the data better than the basic and log encoding models. On the other hand, the fit decision
prior model can explain the estimate bias towards greater values.

Go to Table of Contents

98

Correlation with decision

Experiment 2

Experiment 3

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.6

0.6

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.2

All trials
Uncertainty: 2
Uncertainty: 10

0.1
0

2

4
Number position

6

8

0.2

All trials
Uncertainty: 4
Uncertainty: 10

0.1
0

0

2

4

6

8

Number position

Figure 4.8: Correlation of sample position and decision. The graphs show Pearson correlation between subjects’ decision and number position in the presented sequence. The
correlation is high for low stimulus uncertainty and is almost constant across the number
positions. When the stimulus uncertainty is larger, some well-known patterns emerge such
as the overweight of last samples (recency effect) or first samples (primacy effect). In Experiment 2, the positional effects are not very clear. In Experiment 3, there is a significant
recency effect.
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Chapter 5
General discussion

5.1. Summary of thesis contribution
In chapter 2, I first replicated the bias effect in Jazayeri and Movshon (2007) with a different
stimulus (lines’ orientation instead of dots’ motion direction, Exp. 1). Importantly, I postulated that the sequential dependency between judgments arises because humans are inclined
to maintain self-consistency along the whole inference process. The self-consistency principle is formalized by self-consistent Bayesian observer model which assumes the observer
treats its first decision as a fact and uses that to constrain the inference in subsequent judgments. In two additional experiments, I validated the model’s key assumptions, namely, the
observer performs Bayesian inference (Experiment 2) and totally trusted its first decision
(Experiment 3). Combining that with model fit to data in three experiments by Zamboni
et al. (2016), I demonstrated the ability of the self-consistent Bayesian observer model to
quantitatively account for human behaviors across a wide range of experimental settings.
In chapter 3, I studied how subjects maintain sensory representation in working memory
after the first decision. Subjects performed a sequence of decision and estimation tasks on
orientation stimulus as in the previous chapter. The main difference is that subjects were
given feedback on the decision task. To compare several strategies of maintaining and using
sensory representation, I fit self-consistent Bayesian model to correct trials and predicting
incorrect trials. The results of model comparison suggest that subjects maintain the full
sensory representation and uses that to perform the estimation task.
In chapter 4, I tested the sequential dependency on a high-level stimulus variable, numerosity. In Experiment 1, a cloud of dots was briefly presented. Then subjects first
indicated whether the number of dots was less or greater than 40 and subsequently re-
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ported the number of dots. Experimental results show very similar bias pattern in subjects’
estimates as found in the low-level stimuli (e.g. orientation). Additional experiments using
symbolic number stimuli show similar characteristic biases, which suggests that sequential
dependency also occurs for high-level cognitive variable and share similar features with the
low-level perceptual variable.

5.2. Testable predictions of self-consistency principle
My thesis has primarily focused on the sequential tasks in which subjects perform two
perceptual judgments on the same sensory evidence. Sequential dependency between judgments, however, has been found in a diverse range of other cognitive decision scenarios
(see section 1.1). It is not clear whether the self-consistency principle may provide a good
account of those situations as well. To demonstrate the potential of self-consistent Bayesian
observer framework, I will outline in this section how we may explain sequential dependency
in two other popular cognitive scenarios discussed in section 1.1. Because this may also have
important implication for perceptual decision, I suggest two perceptual psychophysics experiments to test the model’s prediction in analogous scenarios.

5.2.1. Sequential judgments on multiple attributes
Halo effect: In a classic study by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), subjects first made a judgment
about an instructor’s likability and then had to rate his specific attributes like physical attractiveness and accent. When the instructor’s verbal expression was warm and respectful
(highly likable), subjects’ ratings of the specific attributes were strongly favorable. In contrast, the ratings were significantly downgraded when the same instructor’s verbal expression was cold and distrustful. In brief, subjects’ judgments on a global attribute (likability)
biased judgments on other specific attributes (physical attractiveness).
Rational model: One explanation for the effect is that there exists an inherent correlational structure underlying the global attribute and the specific attributes. For instance,
there is an inherent positive correlation between likability and physical attractiveness. As
a result, subjects’ judgments of the two attributes are naturally correlated. To demonstrate this point, I consider a toy example in which an observer makes judgments on two
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attributes of an instructor: whether he is likable (C = {”likable”, ”unlikable”}) and how
attractive he is (Fig. 5.1a). I also assume that likability (θ) and attractiveness (γ) can be
quantified on a continuous scale such that the neutral state is 0 (e.g. θ = −4 indicates
’unlikable’). Crucially, the two attributes are statistically linked through the conditional
probability p(γ|C). For example, p(γ|C = ”likable”) represents the distribution of physical attractiveness given that the instructor is likable. Hence if p(γ|C = ”likable”) and
p(γ|C = ”unlikable”) are not exactly the same, there is an inherent correlation between
likability and attractiveness. An example in Fig. 5.1a illustrates a plausible scenario in
which attractiveness tends to be higher when the instructor is likable. In addition, we
assume that the observer doesn’t have access to the true value of likability and attractiveness. Due to several kinds of ambiguity (e.g. perceptual uncertainty), the observer can
only obtain noisy samples mθ and mγ of the true likability θ and physical attractiveness
γ. Given this setup, the observer’s task is to use the observed samples mθ and mγ to
make inference about likability C and attractiveness γ. I performed computer simulation
for this scenario to illustrates the rational model’s prediction. In the simulation, I use the
probability distributions illustrated in Fig. 5.1b. Specifically, the prior distribution over C
is uniform (i.e. P (C = ”likable”) = P (C = ”unlikable)); the prior distributions over θ
and γ are uniform in the range [−20, 20]. Uncertainty in the perceptual information mθ
and mγ is characterized by p(mθ |θ) and p(mγ |γ) which are normal distribution centered on
θ and γ, respectively. The noise of attractiveness is fixed at a moderate value (standard
deviation σ=7) while likability assumes two noise levels (σlow =1, σhigh =18). Note that the
scale here is chosen arbitrarily; thus what matters is the relative values between parameters.
The simulation results in Fig. 5.1c show qualitatively different patterns in the observer’s
estimate of attractiveness for different likability noise levels. When likability is less noisy,
the attractiveness rating is biased away from the neutral point 0, forming a characteristic
bimodal pattern. However, when likability is noisier, attractiveness rating has a more unimodal pattern centered on the true attractiveness (i.e. the diagonal line). Essentially, the
rational model takes into account the noise in likability judgment when it makes judgment
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about the attractiveness. On the one hand, if the likability noise is small, it will exploit the
conditional dependency between likability and attractiveness to resolve the uncertainty in
the attractiveness judgment. On the other hand, if the likability noise is very large, it will
neglect the likability information and rely mainly on the attractiveness information. That
explains the high bias, low variance in low likability noise and low bias, high variance in high
likability noise. Here the bias magnitude is analogous to the correlation between attribute
judgments. Nevertheless, empirical findings have shown that the correlation between attribute judgments are significantly greater than the inherent correlation of the attributes
(Leuthesser et al., 1995; Thorndike, 1920). Therefore, it was hypothesized that there must
be additional interaction between the judgments. This will be explored in the self-consistent
model.
Self-consistent model: Built on the principle of self-consistency, I assume that after the
observer makes judgment on likability, it considers the judgment as a fact and conditions
the subsequent attractiveness judgment on that (Fig. 5.2a). As a result of the conditioning,
the attractiveness judgments will always be biased, regardless of the likability noise and
the bias pattern is analogous to the rational model’s prediction when the likability noise
is zeros. The simulation result is shown in Fig. 5.2b. Importantly, if we average across
all noise levels of likability, the observed biases in attractiveness judgment would be much
greater than that in the rational model. That can explain the additional correlation between
judgments above and beyond the intrinsic correlation between attributes.
The sequential dependency between cognitive judgments discussed above has implications for several perceptual situations. In object perception studies, there is an intrinsic
hierarchical structure between global attributes (e.g. object identity) and local attributes
(e.g. color, texture, shape) of an object (Kersten et al., 2004). Even in perceptual studies
targeting only one low-level variable, the stimuli often contain more than one attribute.
For example, research on cue combination typically involves several cues (sometimes from
different sensory modalities) that subjects have to integrate to make a perceptual judgment (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Körding et al., 2007; Alais and Burr, 2004). The stimuli in
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Figure 5.1: Rational Bayesian observer of multi-attribute judgment (a) Generative model:
C is a categorical variable and θ is a continuous variable on likability. γ is a continuous
variable on attractiveness. mθ and mγ are perceptual information the observer has about
the instructor’s likability and attractiveness. The observer uses the perceptual information
to sequentially make judgments on likability and attractiveness. (b) There exists a correlational structure between the likablity and attractiveness which is demonstrated by P (γ|C).
In this example, attractiveness is higher when the instructor is likable. (c) Prediction of rational model: The attractiveness judgment is plotted against the true attractiveness. When
likability noise is low, attractiveness judgment is biased away from the neutral level. In
contrast, the distribution of attractiveness judgment is not biased when the likability noise
is high.
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Figure 5.2: Self-consistent observer of multi-attribute judgment (a) After making judgment
on likability, the observer considers the judgment ĈC as a fact and use that to constrain
inference on attractiveness γ. (b) Prediction of self-consistent model: Self-consistent inference results in similar bias magnitude in attractiveness judgment across all likability noise
levels. The bias magnitude is equivalent to the zero likability noise condition of the rational
model. The bias patterns are different between low and high likability noise conditions
because the observer is more likely to be incorrect in the likability judgment in the high
noise condition which results in the more noticeable long tail in attractiveness judgment.
working memory experiments also contain multiple task-relevant features (e.g. recall the
orientation of a blue line that was presented with other colored lines) (Zhang and Luck,
2008; Bays and Husain, 2008; Wilken and Ma, 2004). Moreover, as research in perception
moves towards studying perceptual decision in more natural settings (e.g. more natural
stimuli), it is inevitable that the perceptual situation involves stimuli with a rich hierarchical structure of multiple attributes. Therefore, it is both interesting and relevant to study
whether perceptual judgments in these situations have similar sequential dependency as in
cognitive judgments. In the next section, I suggest a simple perceptual experiment involving
sequential decisions on two low-level attributes of the same stimulus.
Test the halo effect at low-level perception
Experimental design: I use low-level stimuli to have a better control over the attributes.
The stimuli and experimental set-up are illustrated in Fig. 5.3. The stimulus is an array
of colored line segments. I take the overall orientation of the array as the global attribute
θ. Two noise levels of stimulus orientation can be obtained by changing the variance of the
distribution the lines’ orientation are sampled from. The hue of line segments represents the
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Figure 5.3: Experimental test of halo effect at low-level perception. Subjects are presented
with a color array of line segments. They first make a categorical decision on the overall
orientation of the array. Subsequently, they rotate an arrow around the color wheel to
match the perceived color of the array.
specific attribute γ. To obtain a moderate noise level of the hue attribute, we may either
tune the chromaticity of the background or the saturation of the line segments. The joint
distribution of the orientation and hue dimensions is the same as in the above simulation.
After viewing the stimulus, subjects first indicate whether the overall orientation of the
array was clockwise or counter-clockwise of a reference orientation. Then they have to
estimate the hue by adjusting an arrow around a color wheel. The color that the arrow
points to is presented on a disk inside the color wheel.
Analysis: When the hue values are close to the center range, the rational model predicts
larger repulsive biases in color estimate for lower orientation noise level. In contrast, the
self-consistent model predicts the same biases in color estimate across all orientation noise
levels. As a simple statistical test, we can conduct a two-tailed t-test between the low and
high orientation noise conditions with the color judgment bias as the dependent variable.
Alternatively, we can fit the two models to subjects’ data to see which model can result in
a better fit. Because the two models have the same generative model and parameters, I can
directly compare the maximum log likelihood of model fit.
Anticipated and alternative result: If the results favor the self-consistent observer model,
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it demonstrates that the halo effect appears even at low-level perception. Alternatively, we
may find lower biases for higher orientation noise as predicted by the rational model. In
this scenario, it could be that at low-level perception, humans are able to take into account
the dependencies between attributes to make a rational judgment. However, it does not
rule out the possibility that in a more complex setting, people will eventually revert to
self-consistent inference. Another explanation for the null result is that subjects fail to
learn the experimentally induced probabilistic relations between features. Therefore, it is
essential to have sufficient training and manipulation check to guarantee that subjects learn
the stimulus statistics.

5.2.2. Incorporating additional evidence after a preliminary decision
Sunk cost fallacy: Another kind of bias that may arise in sequential decisions is when we
first make a preliminary decision on the current evidence and then make another decision
given additional evidence. An example experiment in real-life setting was described in Arkes
and Blumer (1985). At a theater, the ticket price was randomly chosen between a normal
($15) and a discount price ($2) for the buyers within a certain period of time. The tickets
were marked so that the experimenter could track how many people would go to the show
for each ticket price. The result shows that more people with the normal-priced tickets went
to the show. If we consider the act of buying ticket as the first decision and the act of going
to the show as the second decision, the findings suggest that subjects’ second decision was
biased by how much they had decided to spend on the ticket (i.e. the sunk cost).
In a similar decision situation but with perceptual stimuli, Bronfman et al. (2015) found
that after having made a preliminary decision, subjects tended to underweight the subsequent evidence in the final judgment. That results in the bias effect like the sunk-cost fallacy.
Along the same line, studies on perceptual confidence suggest that after making a decision,
subjects still accumulate sensory evidence until a confidence judgment is made (Pleskac
and Busemeyer, 2010) and there exist biases in the post-decision evidence accumulation
(Yu et al., 2015a; Navajas et al., 2016). Another relevant line of works in perception posits
that there are two pathways in visual processing: a fast, low spatial frequency pathway
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(magnocellular) and a slow, high spatial frequency pathway (parvocellular) (Bar, 2004; Bar
et al., 2006; O’Callaghan et al., 2016). The authors suggest that the fast pathway comes
up with a preliminary coarse judgment (e.g. on the context) and uses that to constrain
and facilitate the final judgment when the fine-detailed sensory information comes in from
the slow pathway. Those perceptual situations bear a close resemblance to the sunk cost
fallacy scenario in cognitive judgments. It is possible that the biases in perceptual studies
share similar mechanisms as the biases in cognitive literature. Therefore, I propose a perceptual experiment with similar task setting to test whether the self-consistency principle
may account for those biases.
Experimental design: The experimental setup is similar to Experiment 1 in chapter 2.
In each trial, I draw a stimulus orientation from a uniform distribution around a randomly
chosen reference orientation. Then I draw two samples of line segments, each sample containing 24 segments, from a Gaussian centered on the stimulus orientation. Subjects are
first presented with one sample and have to tell whether the stimulus orientation is CCW
or CW of the reference. After that, they view the second sample and have to estimate
the stimulus orientation by adjusting a probe line. In this experiment, it is important to
instruct subjects about the structure of the stimulus and the task. Specifically, subjects
are instructed that in each trial, there is a box containing a large number of line segments.
First, a set of line segments are drawn from this box and they have to guess whether the
mean orientation of all line segments in the box was CCW or CW of the reference. Then
I show them another set drawn from the same box and they have to estimate the mean
orientation of all line segments in the box.
Prediction of alternative models: In the simulation, I assume the prior distribution of
stimulus orientation is uniform in the range [−21, 21] deg; sensory noise follows a normal
distribution which is centered on the stimulus orientation and has a standard deviation
of 7 deg. Fig. 5.4a shows the generative model of the task and the inference process of
the rational model. The observer uses the first sensory sample m1 to decide whether the
stimulus orientation is clockwise or counterclockwise relative to the reference. Then upon
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receiving the second sample m2 they use both to estimate the stimulus orientation. The
rational model predicts no repulsive biases in the estimation; thus the estimation pattern
is unimodally distributed around the true stimulus orientation (Fig. 5.4a). In contrast,
the self-consistent model treats the first decision as a fact and uses that in the subsequent
estimation with both samples. That leads to repulsive biases and accordingly bimodal
pattern of estimate distribution (Fig. 5.4b) The most notable trials is when the first sample
leads to the wrong conclusion and the second sample provides contradictory information
(Fig. 5.4c). The rational observer can use the second sample to revise the judgment and
make unbiased estimates. On the contrary, the self-consistent observer distorts the sensory
evidence to make it consistent with the first decision.

5.3. Self-consistent inference
5.3.1. Benefits of self-consistency
So far the self-consistent Bayesian observer model has been shown to account for several
post-decision biases across different stimuli and situations. However, it is unclear what
benefit the self-consistent inference may bring about in those situations. In the absence of
memory noise, it is quite straightforward that a standard Bayesian observer should outperform the self-consistent observer in terms of accuracy. With memory noise, I have shown
in chapter 2 that subjects’ sequential judgments are consistent with each other only when
they perform self-consistent inference (see section 2.5). Nevertheless, it still doesn’t directly
address any advantage the self-consistent inference may have. To target this issue, I took
the fit parameters of nine subjects in Exp. 1-3, chapter 2 and performed model simulation
to compute the mean squared error for the self-consistent Bayesian model and the standard
Bayesian model. Interestingly, the self-consistent model outperforms the standard Bayesian
model for 6 out of 9 subjects (Fig. 5.5a). The results are similar regardless of whether I take
into account the motor noise in the computation or not. A closer look at the mean squared
error indicates a pretty consistent pattern across subjects that the lower the sensory noise
is, the better the self-consistent model is compared to the standard Bayesian model. In
fact, this pattern is not solely modulated by the magnitude of sensory noise itself but the
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Figure 5.4: Modeling sunk cost fallacy (a) Rational observer model: The observer uses the
first sensory evidence m1 to make a categorical decision C = {”CW ”, ”CCW ”}. After
receiving the second sensory evidence m2 , it uses both pieces of evidence to make inference
on the stimulus orientation θ. (b) Self-consistent observer model: The first categorical
decision is the same as the rational model. Importantly, the observer considers that decision
as completely true and uses that decision to constrain inference in the following estimation.
As a result, the distribution of estimates has a characteristic bimodal pattern. (c) Distortion
of sensory evidence: To illustrate how the self-consistent observer distorts the evidence, I
picked the trials for which the stimulus orientation is in the range [10, 21] and the first
sensory evidence falls on the incorrect side, that is m1 < 0 (the blue-shaded region in b).
Because the stimulus orientation is far away from the boundary, it is very likely that the
second sensory sample falls on the correct side. Therefore a rational model that merely
integrates the two samples will be likely to make estimates that fall on the correct side.
In contrast, the self-consistent observer maintains self-consistent with the first decision
by distorting the sensory evidence. That results in the estimates that always fall on the
incorrect side like the first sensory evidence.
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Figure 5.5: Advantage of self-consistent Bayesian observer (a) Ratio of mean squared error
(MSE) between self-consistent and standard Bayesian model are shown for each individual
subject and stimulus noise level. A ratio less than 1 means the self-consistent Bayesian
model is better. The mean squared error is computed across the full range of stimulus
orientation. The upper graph shows the results when motor noise is not taken into account
and in the lower graph, the motor noise is incorporated in the error computation. (b)
Correlation between the ratio of MSE and the ratio of memory to sensory noise. Each dot
corresponds to one subject and one noise level.
sensory noise relative to memory noise. There is a high negative correlation between the
model MSE ratio and the sensory to memory noise ratio (Fig. 5.5b). More specifically, the
higher the memory noise is relative to sensory noise, the better the self-consistent model
is compared to the standard Bayesian model. This is consistent with simulation results
documented elsewhere (Luu et al., 2017).
To understand why self-consistent inference is beneficial when memory noise is high
compared to sensory noise, let’s consider an extreme situation when the sensory noise is
negligible and memory noise is almost infinite. In that case, the first decision based on
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initial sensory information is very accurate whereas the memory recall contains insignificant
information about the stimulus. As a result, the standard Bayesian model that only uses
memory recall to make estimation will be worse than the self-consistent Bayesian model
that uses both the preceding decision and the memory recall. Here we assume that the
categorical decision is not degraded by memory noise whereas the sensory representation is.
The assumption is plausible because the one-bit representation of binary decision is more
robust to noise than the continuous sensory representation of the stimulus. Note that the
above analysis is only limited to the simple experiments in Chapter 2. Future works are
needed to determine whether the findings hold for other more natural scenarios and more
interestingly, whether humans can adaptively adjust the inference strategy to maximize
performance across different situations.
Another potential benefit of self-consistent inference is that it can save computational
costs in situations where the task sequence is more complex than the simple experiments
in laboratory settings. Starting from the top, it reduces the decision tree at every level
of the hierarchy by considering only the chosen branch, substantially reducing the overall
computational complexity and cost associated with solving the inference problem. Selfconsistent inference may represent a general strategy for the brain to address the costaccuracy trade-off when solving hierarchical decision-making problems. This also may have
important implications for learning and belief updating in biological as well as artificial
neural networks, in particular for networks that are aimed at learning a generative model
(e.g. deep belief networks).

5.3.2. Conditioning likelihood and loss function
In my thesis, the self-consistent Bayesian observer enforces self-consistency by conditioning
the prior on the preceding decision. Although the model can account well for the data, it
is not the only way to implement self-consistency in the Bayesian framework. In principle,
we can also condition the likelihood function and/or the loss function to make it consistent
with the preceding decision. The interpretation, however, would be different for conditioning
different components of a Bayesian observer. Conditioning the prior means changing the

Go to Table of Contents

112

a

b

Prior conditioning
0.005

20

-0.005

-20
-40
-22 -11 0

mm

0

0

CCW

70

70

0

0

-70

-70
-40

11 22 -22 -11 0

11 22 -22 -11 0

p(mm|Ө, ‘cw’)

p(mm|Ө)

CW

40

0
Ө

11 22

-40

40

Estimated orientation (deg)

Likelihood conditioning
40

p(Ө|mm=2.4, ‘cw’)

p(mm=2.4|Ө, ‘cw’)

20
0

0

40

Normalized p(mm|Ө, ‘cw’)
70

0

-20
-40
-22 -11 0

11 22 -22 -11 0 11 22 -22 -11 0
Stimulus orientation (deg)

-40

11 22

0
Ө

40

-40

0
Ө

40

-70
-40

0

40

Figure 5.6: Conditioning the likelihood. (a) The distribution of the observer’s estimate is
shown when conditioning occurs in the prior (upper panel) or the likelihood (lower panel).
Three columns correspond to three stimulus noise levels with increasing noise from left
to right. The parameters used for the simulation are taken from the fit parameters of
combined subject in Exp. 1, chapter 2. (b) Likelihood conditioning flips the estimate.
p(mm |θ) indicates the distribution of memory recall mm given a stimulus orientation θ.
The conditioned distribution p(mm |θ, ‘cw’) indicates the distribution of memory recall that
Rresults from the sensory measurement m on the cw side. After normalization so that
p(mm |θ, ‘cw’)dm = 1, the likelihood function is skewed towards the ccw side. As a result,
the estimate from the posterior p(θ|mm , ‘cw’) is on the ccw part as illustrated in the case
mm = 2.4. Note that this just happens for the samples mm that are around 0 which explains
why the flipping only occurs for the stimulus orientation close to the boundary.
observers’ belief about the statistical regularity of the external world. On the other hand,
conditioning the likelihood means changing the observer’s belief about the internal sensory
processing. By conditioning the loss function, the observer changes belief about how each
action is rewarded.
In terms of the observed behavior, different types of conditioning may have very distinct signatures. To illustrate the difference between prior and likelihood conditioning, I
computed the prediction of the self-consistent observer for the basic task in Exp. 1, chapter
2 in which subjects made a decision and then an estimation of the stimulus orientation
(Fig. 5.6a). The patterns of estimate distribution are markedly different between these two
types of conditioning. Likelihood conditioning leads to counterintuitive results in which the
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observer’s estimates are contradictory with the decision when the stimulus orientation is
close to the decision boundary (see Fig. 5.6b for technical detail). It also clearly shows
that for the experimental settings studied in my thesis, prior conditioning provides a better explanation than the likelihood conditioning. That makes sense because conceptually,
changing the prior and the loss function seems to be the more intuitive and plausible than
the likelihood because the sensory process is often more stable and more accessible to the
observer than the external world and the reward structure. As a result, likelihood conditioning may happen only in special cases such as patients with neurological disorders that makes
the sensory processing unstable. Computationally, conditioning the loss function would be
more complicated because the observer has to take into account the motor noise (Tank and
Stocker, 2014) and the reward contingency of each action (Trommershäuser et al., 2003,
2008). Note that the different types of conditioning are not mutually exclusive. In other
words, the self-consistent observer can apply a combination of those conditioning strategies.
For example, both the prior and the likelihood can be conditioned simultaneously which
indicates that the observer attempts to be self-consistent in both encoding and decoding.

5.4. General implications for decision-making study
The fact that subjects condition their estimate on their preceding decision does not imply
that they are necessarily fully confident in their decision; we propose that they simply do
so in order to remain self-consistent. Our results show that conditioning is statistically
independent of the difficulty and thus on subjects’ confidence in their discrimination judgment (i.e. their psychometric function). However, it remains an interesting open question
particularly in context of the ongoing discussion about decision confidence (Kepecs et al.,
2008; van den Berg et al., 2016; Fleming and Daw, 2017) whether or not conditioning improves subjects’ confidence in their subsequent estimate since it leads to a reduced posterior
distribution.
Another interesting question is whether an explicit categorical commitment is necessary
to induce self-consistent conditioning or whether the brain always, and thus implicitly, performs conditioned inference (Ding et al., 2017). This question is difficult to answer because
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without explicit access to a subject’s trial-by-trial categorical judgment, differences in the
subsequent feature inference process are often hard to distinguish statistically. Only in special cases when, for example, a clear discrimination boundary is present, these differences
have a clear behavioral signature that can be identified (e.g. the characteristic repulsive
estimation pattern in Experiment 1, see Figure 2.1). Identification is further complicated
because repulsive biases may also arise due to other effects such as the efficient adaptation
of sensory encoding resources (Wei and Stocker, 2015), which likely takes place during perceptual learning (e.g. Szpiro et al. (2014); see also Wei and Stocker (2017)). In fact, it
may well be that implicit self-consistent inference is the fundamental process by which the
brain solves inference problems, yet its behavioral characteristics are simply not often apparent. For example, we expect self-consistent conditioning to happen implicitly in object
recognition of learned object categories: when an observer recognizes an object as e.g. an
“apple”, the percept of the object’s features (e.g. the color) will automatically be conditioned on that recognized category. In order to detect the effects of this conditioning in
perceptual behavior, however, we would need to know the specifics of the learned generative
models over the object categories, which is typically a difficult problem. In other situations,
such as in a typical psychophysical experiment with its sparse and artificial stimuli and
little context, the observer may simply be given little incentive to interpret the stimulus
within a hierarchical representation (generative model). Because the self-consistent inference model over a flat generative model is identical to an optimal Bayesian observer model,
the large number of studies that have shown that perception is well explained as optimal
Bayesian inference may actually not be conclusive; their data is equally well explained by
the self-consistent inference model! This is obviously a strong hypothesis that needs further
experimental evaluation.
Results from recent physiological recordings in primates suggest not only that decisionmaking is associated with rapid cortical state-changes (Meindertsma et al., 2017) but also
that decision-related signals are fed back along the perceptual processing pathway all the
way to early sensory areas (Nienborg and Cumming, 2009; Siegel et al., 2015). The proposed
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self-consistent observer model provides a novel computational interpretation of these neural
signals: at the moment a decision is reached the belief state of the brain rapidly changes
(in favor of the choice made, expressing strong over-confidence, see Peters et al. (2017))
and is fed back to ensure that the perceptual inference process remains consistent across
the different cortical levels of representation at any moment in time. The self-consistent
model may prove a useful hypothesis to constructively explore the function and purpose of
such decision-related signal flows in the brain. Future work needs to explore how exactly
our model formulation can be interpreted at a more mechanistic neural level (Luu and
Stocker, 2016). Various theoretical frameworks have been proposed for how the brain might
perform Bayesian inference (e.g. Ma et al. (2006); Simoncelli (2009); Wei and Stocker
(2012); Pitkow and Angelaki (2017)). It remains an interesting challenge to investigate how
these frameworks can incorporate the self-consistency constraint that we propose here, in
particular the process of quickly and flexibly imposing a conditional prior.
Our results show interesting parallels to many well-known bias phenomena in cognition
and economics, such as confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), biases associated with cognitive consistency (Brehm, 1956; Abelson, 1968) and dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Festinger
and Carlsmith, 1959; Egan et al., 2010; Sharot et al., 2010), as well as loss aversion and
the sunk cost fallacy (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). Our findings seem also aligned with
results from human probability judgments over hierarchical representations which found
that subjects rather follow individual probability branches than to resolve the entire probability tree (Lagnado and Shanks, 2003). It will be interesting to explore to what degree
the proposed self-consistent model generalizes to these cognitive phenomena and is able to
provide a parsimonious, quantitative explanation.
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